

## D-Day for Social Action

AN EDITORIAL

That the war in Europe may be won before another issue of The Journal gets into the hands of its readers, is a possibility startling to contemplate; and one cannot know what the mood and temper of the American people will be with reference to critical social issues, and political action in their behalf, once the strain and tension of the great conflict is lifted. What has become clear, however, is that never before have there been so many major political and economic problems which are generally recognized—at one and the same time—as religious and moral problems as well. It is thus that the whole world has become our social front.

### Three Areas of Major Concern

From the point of view of group study and action in the churches it might be said that there are three major areas in which we ought to try at some point to make our efforts count. These areas are (1) *international relations*, (2) *the defense of minority groups* and (3) *and the fight for post-war economic security*. Whatever influence we exert will fall somewhere within these areas. To be sure, our effectiveness is limited, is slow to make itself felt, and is almost impossible to measure. And since the legislator has the decisive word, the function of religion is confined to creating a climate of public opinion in which a good legislator may be elected, and in which he can work and vote more effectively once he is installed in office. In the face of the opposing forces now at large this is a staggering assignment. It is all the more staggering when one reflects that within churches and denominations are elements of disunity which militate against effective action. Unless, therefore, we seek to unite our efforts on certain well chosen sectors of the larger world front—on a minimum rather than a maximum of immediate goals—we shall only invite disillusionment and defeat.

Within the general areas of social concern there are specific points of contact with reference to which we have

a special opportunity and a special responsibility, constituting as it were, this irreducible minimum.

### **Hatred of Russia, the "Great Frustration"**

In the foreign field our major concern would seem to be the persistent cultivation of friendship and mutual trust with Soviet Russia. If on the international scene there is *one* "great frustration," it is the returning tide of fear and hatred of communism. The tide has ebbed somewhat for four years, now, thanks to Russia's incredible achievements in her fight against Germany. It is perhaps more correct to say that the tide of hatred has been held in abeyance. It is now flowing again, deliberately aided and abetted by familiar elements within our capitalist society, by politicians in both major political parties, by official spokesman for the Republican party, and by conspicuous leaders of the Catholic hierarchy. Here, then, is formidable opposition; and it is obvious that if these forces, rather than those seeking friendship with the people of Russia, become dominant in America, then the peace of the world—despite growing American sentiment in favor of international cooperation—will be sabotaged before it gets itself established. Now is the time for the liberal forces of organized religion to give the economic and political forces looking to the same end, all the moral support they can. Next year it may be too late.

### **Perpetuating Fair Employment Practice**

In the area of race relations the fulcrum of our influence and power—in addition to our continuing, unified resistance to anti-Semitism—may very well be the present effort in Washington to perpetuate the *Fair Employment Practices Committee*, better known as the FEPC. Here is an issue which stands out clear and sharp, and in the support of which powerful forces within organized religion can be rallied. Formulated primarily under the pressure which intelligent Negro leadership itself exerted, the FEPC has been remarkably effective. In the larger factories where, under its protection Negroes were employed for the first time, white workers were often astonished at the ease with which they could accept the situation. And inasmuch as Negroes have always constituted America's largest racial minority a



measure designed for their protection will provide for other minorities a similar defense against discrimination.

### Full Employment and a Mixed Economy

Obviously enough, the FEPC points to a third area of common concern; for fair employment cannot be guaranteed to Negroes and other minorities if there is unemployment for millions of the white majority. That private enterprise will be able to put ten million returning soldiers, and twice or three times that number of war production workers back into decent civilian employment, very few people can get themselves to believe. Our American life has obviously already moved in the direction of a mixed economy. It will probably move much faster after the war, and henceforth "private enterprise" will have to maintain itself as best it can within the larger framework of state and federal planning. It is a situation brought about, not so much by moral suasion or by economic design, as by force of circumstances. It is the expression of a relentless social and historic trend for which education must now provide, not merely a philosophy of acceptance, but a philosophy of direction, also, and a theory of control. Willy-nilly we are provided now with a dramatic situation unprecedented in history: geographical frontiers are no more, only social frontiers are left; and it remains for man to demonstrate that he can make not only a great social success, but a great spiritual enterprise out of his collective life on earth. In that demonstration, what with many faiths each still claiming to be THE faith, liberal religion will have an increasingly significant role to play.

EDWIN T. BUEHRER.

### *New Associate Editor*

With this issue of THE JOURNAL the staff welcomes a new Associate Editor. He is Harmon M. Gehr, Minister of the Church of the Restoration (Universalist) of Philadelphia. Mr. Gehr, succeeding Donald B. F. Hoyt, brings to THE JOURNAL a critical and scholarly mind, and a capable pen. His coming continues the strength which representatives of the Universalist denomination have always brought to this publication.

## *Humanism and Agnosticism*

By HORACE S. FRIES

*Two philosophers discuss the ancient problem. Prof. Fries asks some searching questions with reference to the significance of the term "God". Prof. Hartshorne contends that the concept is not only significant, but logically valid.*

"For the humanist to hold that he is the apex of consciousness, that no purpose exists above himself," writes a humanist, "is as unimaginative, as presumptuous, and as narrowly orthodox as would be the belief of an earthworm which could neither hear nor see nor smell, that nothing exists which does not touch his body. . . . The humanist, in his revolt from superstition and from unsupported philosophical assumptions, sometimes arrives at the naive conclusion that what he has not seen does not exist."<sup>1</sup>

I have no wish to defend irresponsible humanists. But I know of none who directly or by implication says that what is not seen does not exist. Yet if naturalistic humanism is to be a vigorous way of life, if it is to be significantly distinguished from the hodge-podge of "humanisms" known as literary and "true" humanism, then it seems to me we must come to serious grips with half-hearted agnosticism, and let ourselves know just what it is we put our faith in.

Another humanist has written in a very different vein: "I have for myself arrived at an affirmative faith in the non-existence of God."<sup>2</sup> He continues to point out the important difference between the state of absence of belief in God and the state of having a positive belief that God does not exist. I take the state of mere absence of belief to be a species of agnosticism, a species of "humanism" which falls into one or both of two errors which we shall look at presently. But the "affirmative faith in the nonexistence of God" is a faith that as men free themselves from notions of obligations to the cosmos they can get down to the business of developing a more effective responsibility to their fellow men. The humanist of faith believes that there are great cooperative purposes over and above his own all but insignificant indi-



vidual efforts and concerns. He also believes there are natural conditions which must be conformed with in order to be submitted to human purposes. But there is no need to assume a purpose over and above *men's* purposes. The human enterprise, viewed concretely, is involved and complicated enough and includes enough joy and sorrow, victory and tragedy, nobleness and beastiality, to keep human imagination forever busy. Viewed concretely, rather than as a mere aspect of some "*Cosmic Reality*," it will also stabilize one's sense of humility and keep his need for cooperative action alive and sensitive.

One of the errors of agnosticism to which we referred is the practical one of not having faith enough in anything to be willing to commit one's actions to it. It means vacillation, undependability and want of direction. It confuses faith with dogmatism, and fails to see that belief can be tentative, yet firm and convinced. Darwin had the faith and the courage to commit his actions to the theory of evolution before he had proved it to his own satisfaction. Any scientist who acts upon a hypothesis to test it must have enough faith in it to put it to the test.

### The Fallacies of Agnosticism

It is not easy for humanists to avoid this first or practical fallacy of agnosticism. Perhaps one precautionary step is to avoid a second, logical error. This second error lies in the belief that the only reasonable ground for "an affirmative faith in the nonexistence of God" is logical proof that there is no such being. Unfortunately, the traditional separation of faith and reason clouds our insight here. We are likely to believe that faith means the absence of logic.

But by the logical foundation for humanistic atheism we do not mean an *a priori* proof that God does not exist. On the contrary, we mean a logical commitment to the nonexistence of God because of the want of evidence to date of such existence *and because of our positive faith in men*.

Humanism, I take it, has faith in the potentialities of men. It has faith also that these potentialities can be more fully actualized by the discovery of natural causal connections by means of which the everyday realities of exist-

ence can be transformed into something a little richer than heretofore. By making the natural conditions of living better, we strive to make life better, happier, more significant.

Now belief in God either means something or it is a mere profession, an emotional compensation for want of faith in something else. What can it mean? It may mean that God has something to do with human choices and decisions. If it really means this to the believer then, certainly, he is committed to seeking out God, that his choices and decisions may be made more significant. Such a "theistic" belief, to use the term narrowly, should not be confused with agnosticism. The agnostic in this case would be one who believes, or sometimes believes, that God is helping his decisions and sometimes believes that it is up to natural inquiry and social cooperation to deepen his own responsibility. He does not believe firmly enough in God to seek Him out; yet he does not believe firmly enough in man to seek *him* out. Of these two species of belief, a firm theism and a soft agnosticism, I should be inclined to prefer the former.

Or belief in God may mean something along more deistic or pantheistic lines. Here choice and belief may be viewed as perfectly "natural" because everything is either God or God's handiwork or else everything is both God and Nature. In either case the *laws* of nature and of men are God's will. Obviously these beliefs (especially the pantheistic kind in recent years) are more tempting to the humanist than is the "theistic" belief, because they more readily preclude belief in divine intervention. The agnosticism of the "humanist" is more likely to be a vacillation between belief in Nature and belief in men than a vacillation between "theism"—in the narrow sense of the term—and atheism. Is it not high time for this last term to be made respectable?

### **The Insufficiency of "Everlasting Laws"**

But even the temptation of pantheism or deism must be overcome by the positive faith of the humanist. For if it means anything it means that the Whole is in some sense perfect or complete and therefore above improvement by men. It is ultimately a falling back on a "block universe." The Whole is there: man's business is to contemplate it or,



at best, to adjust himself to its demands. It is a refusal to accept responsibility, as men, for reconstructing realities to make of them something of a higher quality. It substitutes for the everyday practical reals of life—with their tragedy and beauty—the Real Transcendent Order or Law of Nature. When things go wrong with our practical social efforts or with our own private lives, it enables us to say, “Ah well, we have failed, but never mind, for underneath are the everlasting laws—maybe!”

If we are to place our faith in an ultimate eternal Order of things let us do so frankly and with sincerity and conviction if possible, as Spinoza seems to have done. But let us not suffer the illusion that in so doing we are putting our faith in men. For if men and the world are bound by eternal laws, then we should seek out these laws and commit ourselves to their keeping.

I do not know of any other significant meaning that can be given to the term “God.” Of course, the word can be redefined in a thoroughly naturalistic framework after the manner of Dewey in *A Common Faith*. But even Dewey seems to recognize the dubious value of such redefinition of the word. Certainly when this is done men who are concerned with the vested interests which depend somewhat upon the old *concept* of God try to use the redefined term to confuse and mystify rather than to clarify and sharpen issues. If William James were alive and could no longer view psychic research as a possible avenue to divinities, perhaps he would frame for us another meaning. If so, it would be interesting and have some color, even though it might have little or no moral significance.

If any intelligent man has experiences, or believes others to have experiences which call for concrete, operational inquiry into the nature of God, then he is intellectually obligated to set forth his experience and his procedure in verifiable terms. As a humanist I should welcome his efforts, and should respect him if he sees fit to commit his life to following out such experiences. But let us guard against confusion of the “experience of God” with the “definition of a word.” Any number of classes of experiences might be

singled out and labeled "God." Or any number of abstract possibilities, such as "envisagement of order," "harmonization of contrasts," or other "finite" groupings of concepts,<sup>3</sup> might be made, and compressed into one definition of the word. But if we are to use words for the enrichment of life, it must be because they lead us to experience, not away from it. They must help us to discriminate; they should not clog our thinking. Let us also guard against the appeal to a word as a cloak to hide an appeal for a vested social institution with its traditionally debasing view of human nature.

A humanistic faith is a faith in the potentialities of men and their ability to transform the realities of life into something nobler and richer. It tries to make choice more significant and effective by discovering the natural conditions of choice and by searching for more satisfying realities of concrete experiences. By *committing* ourselves to a faith in men we can at least discover some of the errors in our beliefs about men, and we can refine these beliefs to make them more adequate instrumentalities of the good life. But agnosticism is either an insult to God, if there be a God, or a pale and flickering candle offered as a substitute for the powerful light of experimental control and the meaningful age-old search for the realization of concrete values.

The sincere Christian of former days had to decide in the fire of his own experience of God's word his answer to the problem of evil. The sincere humanist of today must decide the problem of good in the heat of his own experience of men. Otherwise his "solution" will be academic or agnostic; and it were better for humanism and for the world that such "decisions" be not made at all. For they serve only as a cloak for the want of faith, when what is needed is a clarity of conviction that can make our decisions and choices more responsible.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>*The Humanist*, III (Spring, 1943), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>M. C. Otto. *The Human Enterprise*, p. 334. F. S. Crofts and Co. 1940. Quoted by permission of the publishers.

<sup>3</sup>On the futile efforts of men to "create" a significant concept of a finite God see M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, Ch. XI, "War and the God-Makers." Henry Holt and Co., 1924.



## *God and Man Not Rivals*

By CHARLES HARTSHORNE

Professor Fries's "faith in man" is, I believe, sincere and to be commended. However, his argument for atheism seems not very cogent. It is, of course, only fair to note that he lacked space to clarify his ideas. I shall suffer from a similar lack.

Mr. Fries and I can readily agree that (1) some not uncommon ideas of God render faith in God and faith in man incompatible; (2) such ideas ought to be rejected; and (3) the term God should hardly be used for a being conceived as merely finite or imperfect, nor for any mere "grouping of concepts." What I utterly deny is that Mr. Fries, or Mr. Otto, or anyone, has shown that every possible idea of God must come under the terms of (1) or of (3). Until this is shown—and that I think means never—more can not be inferred than this: *some forms* of belief in God are inferior to belief in no-God (together with faith in man). To this modest conclusion I myself incline. But it hardly amounts to a justification of atheism.

Mr. Fries's reasoning implies such incomplete dichotomies as, God is—in all respects and without qualification—imperfect or finite. You might as well say an electron is without qualification a particle, or it is without qualification a wave. It is both. It is atheists, quite as much as theists, who have failed to "sharpen issues," or to "discriminate." Nothing could be more illogical than from "in some sense perfect or complete" to infer, as Mr. Fries does, "incapable of improvement." "In some sense" perfect means "in some sense" incapable of improvement, not "in every sense" thus incapable. This is one of a number of points where the argument overstates its conclusion.

### **The Missing Idea of God**

That some ideas of God are unacceptable does not imply that all ideas are so. Among mutually incompatible ideas about God *all but one* must be incorrect. Hence to examine a number, even a large number, of such ideas and, finding those examined untenable, to conclude, therefore the re-

maining (unexamined) ideas must be untenable also, is not strong reasoning. We have all looked for a missing article, only to find it at last in the one remaining drawer or closet. It is not even safe to assume that it would be by chance alone if the correct idea of God were the last, or nearly the last, to be considered. There may have been unconscious motives or tendencies favoring the downright avoidance of the sound idea. For example, there is the wish for simplicity. It is particularly evident in Professor Otto's writings, but also in many a theological treatise. By longing for the intellectually easy men have often, in the very act of ostensibly exalting God, in reality exalted their own and their felows' mental convenience. This is but one of a number of drives which together might conceivably have brought it about that attention should for centuries have been withheld from the truest idea of God. And if theologians do not examine certain possibilities for conceiving God it is a good deal to expect atheists to be very thorough in doing so. It ought to said, however, that if the truth—and not the atheistic cause prejudged to be the truth—is the aim, just such thoroughness is as incumbent upon atheists as upon theists. There is, alas, not too much in philosophical argument, as hitherto conducted, beyond the straw man fallacy and the argumentum ad hominem. Philosophy will deserve more than very limited respect only when not men (and these often misunderstood) but issues, the logically possible doctrines, are thoroughly explored, accurately defined, and compared, without fear or favor, with experience. This is the lesson natural science has had finally to learn, and philosophy has still but half-learned. No doubt the lesson is peculiarly difficult in philosophy; but difficult does not mean impossible.

If an idea of God can be formed—and I think it already exists<sup>1</sup>—which avoids the pitfalls to which Mr. Fries rightly points, there is still a possibility of arguing that a psychological incompatibility, though no longer a logical one,

<sup>1</sup>See chapter XI of Fechner's *Zendavesta*; the last chapter of Whitehead's *Process and Realty*; Chapter VI of Montague's *Ways of Things*; my *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*. Also, for one of the earliest versions, see Schelling, *The Ages of the World* (transl. by Bolman).



would obtain between faith in God and faith in man. Human attention is limited. The scientist tends to forget art and politics, the artist to forget science and politics, and so on. Similarly, the religious man, intent upon the cosmic personality, tends often to forget the human foreground. But so does the astronomer and the mathematician and the student of insect life. If men never forgot man there would be no men worth remembering. And a *right* idea of God, much more surely than ideas of the stars or of mathematical patterns, sends attention back at appropriate intervals, and with renewed intensity of interest and depth of understanding, to man. For God is the one who really sees and cares for human life correctly. We men, I fear, can be concrete only at moments and about a few intimates, and tend for the most part to view others as "mere aspects" of our environment. If I were concretely there for Mr. Fries, little in his article could be as it is. He could not then brush aside much of what I, and many others, care most about with a few crude, vague, or ambiguous abstractions. The vision of God sends us back to men with the longing to see them a little more nearly concretely, that is, divinely. For, that God's knowledge alone is fully concrete, is a commonplace of nearly all theology, most of all, of the type of theology now struggling to be born.

### God and Man Not Rival Agents

In this new theology, God and man are not rival agents for the same accomplishment. For example, God orders the cosmos, while we order the conscious aspects of our own lives, and through this, the environment, a significant corner of the cosmos. The cosmic order, however, does not consist of inexorable laws which determine also our human choices. It merely determines the *limits* within which the local order is freely determinable by local agents. The supreme power is exercised not over the powerless but over genuine powers. Over what else could it be exercised, since "being is power" (Plato)? A plurality of powers with no supreme power would be chaos, and could not exist. But a plurality of powers with a supreme power is still a plurality of powers; and only crude reasoning and inattention

to verbal ambiguities, which we cannot further follow here, have prevented this from being clearly seen and consistently adhered to.

Our human power is to achieve, and help others to achieve, rich experiences. No more can be claimed for man by the atheist. Now it is illogical to claim that this power is lessened if it be added, as it is in the new theology, that there is One "other" by whom all our experiences, as and because we achieve them, are from that time forth and forevermore enjoyed, and whose supreme power consists in the ability to set optimal limits to our power. The limits may be conceived to be such that, had we *more* freedom, it is the risk rather than the opportunity that would be increased, and had we *less*, it is opportunity rather than risk that would be diminished. To say we should be more ideally free were there *no* being with ideal power, and full determination to furnish us with the ideal extent of our freedom, is nonsense. All that could logically be held is that the idea of God, as the one willing and able to furnish us and all creatures with their optimal freedom, is either inconceivable or unsupported by evidence. But since the clear formulation of the question, unentangled with assumptions from which it is logically independent, is of recent date, it may be rash to proclaim judgment as to the answer.

### **Secularists Have Lacked Faith in Man**

Granting that "debased views" of human nature have often been taught by church people, what follows? In the first place, Professor Fries surely does not mean that underestimating their potentialities for good is the only mistake that can be made concerning human beings. He must desire a realistic not a fatuous faith in man. Now it is a matter of record that secularists have frequently underestimated the capacity of man to commit evil. It is Niebuhr's thesis that the deepest root of this evil is the rebellious wish to be God rather than accept our creaturely status in relation to Him. Atheism is only one form of this rebellion, but still it has its dangers. History also shows that secularists have often been cynics, with little faith in human nature. It is further a fact that some churchmen and some churches have tended to preach human creative capacities. "God



helps those who help themselves"—and each other—is an old though often neglected tenet. There is nothing to prove that the best way to increase men's realistic grasp of their natures and basic opportunities is to discourage alike all churches and all faith in God, rather than with the utmost discrimination to encourage the best churches and the most reasonable faith in God. To say or imply that all ideas of God are equally bad is to give comfort to those who say that no idea of Him can be better than the one they have had all along. Though God and man are not rivals, religions certainly are. Unintelligent and unprogressive religion can be opposed either by preaching the merits of stark atheism or by exhibiting an intelligent, progressive religion. Does Mr. Fries really know that the first is more likely to succeed? Faith in God which contradicts a reasonable faith in man is evil, but this evil might give way faster before the spread of a faith in God which includes and encourages faith in man than before the mere proclamation of faith in man alone.

Atheists as such know nothing about human goodness or capacity which is hidden from theists as such. On the other hand, there may well be something about man that can be clearly seen only by seeing him in relation to the cosmic life. Unconsciousness of God is not in itself glorious; but there might be something glorious about the consciousness of Him. This would be a human glory, even though constituted by a relation to God. This relation would not be a debased state of enslavement to sheer power, but the glory of man (when at his best) as a self-active member of the divine life, a deliberate contributor, through his own self-achievement and his effects upon other creatures, to the everlasting, ever-increasing, all-inclusive beauty of cosmic experience.

Faith in man should, it seems, include trust in his ability eventually to bring accurate logic to bear upon the theistic question. Surely the time will come when philosophers generally will have learned to reason as carefully as scientists. Meanwhile, I hope Mr. Fries and I, in this discussion, are doing something to hasten the day.

## *Religion and Democracy in Colonial America*

By WALTER JOHNSON

*A professor of history tells the thrilling story of a relatively obscure New England preacher, the Rev. John Wise, "of the Chebacco parish at Ipswich," who saw in the doctrine of natural rights a great spiritual truth, and—preaching it—played his part in the development of American democracy.*

The doctrine of natural rights has often been utilized by the underprivileged in society as a convenient method to attack the group in power. During the seventeenth century the dissenters and underprivileged in Massachusetts, however, neglected this doctrine in their attack on the Puritan oligarchy. Instead they relied on the fiction of "the rights of Englishmen," with the result that their pleas usually were in vain. It was not until the doctrine of natural rights had been given classic expression by Samuel Pufendorf, German educator and statesman, and John Locke, British philosopher, that the underprivileged of Massachusetts were to use it in their rise to power.

As far back as the middle of the seventeenth century Puritan preachers had spoken of natural law. John Davenport, in an election sermon before the General Court in 1669, had stated that the "Power of Civil Rule, by men orderly chosen, is God's Ordinance, for It is from the right and Law of Nature, and the Law of Nature is God's Law."<sup>1</sup> It is apparent from this statement that the natural rights doctrine was conceded no separate status outside of the realm of the Law of God; but the doctrine as such was launched into the troubled waters of early eighteenth century Massachusetts by another preacher, John Wise, of the Chebacco parish at Ipswich. Wise did not completely dissociate the relation of God and natural rights, but he minimized the omnipotence of God to such an extent that the theory was to acquire an importance in its own right.

John Wise was prompted to wield his pen through the proclamation of several *Proposals* drawn up by an association of ministers at Boston in 1705. These *Proposals* were



the brainchild of a group of conservative ministers led by the Mathers<sup>2</sup> who desired to return to the stricter type of church government that had held sway in the first twenty years of the colony. The turn of the century had witnessed a decline in the influence of the divines. The new charter had upset the church qualification for civil franchise; the witchcraft delusions had seriously reflected on their ability to guide the destiny of the colony; under Governor Andros an Episcopal church had been set up in Boston.<sup>3</sup> As though all these were not enough to upset the equanimity of the clergy, many signs of the visible decay of religion among the people were apparent.

### New England Divines Stifle Democracy

In the face of these mundane troubles, the Boston Association of Ministers felt it was time to tighten the reins of church government. They wished to apply the Cambridge Platform of another age to their situation. The Cambridge Platform of 1648 had institutionalized the development of the Massachusetts Congregational Church in its first twenty years. According to Samuel Stone, teacher at Hartford, the church was, in this period, "a speaking Aristocracy in the face of a silent Democracy."<sup>4</sup> Although the congregational form of church organization was inherently democratic, the divines of the first generation were able to stifle this local democracy in favor of central control. The Platform drawn up at Cambridge reflects the victory of the aristocratic centralistic group over those that desired more democracy in the church. Although the Platform sets forth that each church is "distinct . . . & therefore have not dominion one over another . . .," it also states that "all the churches ought to preserve *Church-communion* one with another . . ." through the agency of synods. With this entering wedge against local independence achieved, the Platform proceeds to state that the churches so assembled may withdraw from communion with an "erring church." Moreover a wayward church is not to be allowed to proceed in its unlovely way. For "If any church one or more shall grow schismaticall, rendering it self from the communion of other churches, or shall walke incorrigibly or obstinately in any corrupt way

of their own, contrary to the rule of the word; in such case, the Magistrate is to put forth his coercive power. . . ."<sup>5</sup> Therefore, with the aid of the civil power, these synodical gatherings were to have absolute sway over the destinies of any individual church.

The elders under this development of Congregationalism were the leaders of the church. They directed and the brethren followed. As Cotton Mather described it the elders "have a *Negative* on the *Votes* of the Brethren; who, indeed, in the Exercise of their liberty and Privilege are under the conduct of the Elders."<sup>6</sup> When these elders gathered together in a general synod they would have unlimited power. This system agreed heartily with Cotton Mather's distrust of the people, and he aptly epitomised this system which he cherished as "an aristocracy ordering all things with the good-liking of the People."<sup>7</sup>

### The Waning Power of the Elders

Although the theoretical outlines of Massachusetts Congregationalism were bequeathed to succeeding generations, the inheritors of the system found its application beset with many obstacles. John Cotton felt that his generation had fulfilled their duty when he wrote: "It is for us to do all the good we can, and to leave nothing to those that shall come after us, but to walke in the righteous steps of their forefathers."<sup>8</sup> He had however drawn this conclusion without being aware of the transformation that was taking place in the life of Massachusetts. Religious enthusiasm would decline in an area where the people were faced with the practical necessity of conquering a wilderness. As towns settled farther and farther away from Boston, central control by synods would be weakened. The ministers of these frontier towns would associate their interests more with their people than with the conservative ministers of the Bay region.

The central power of the Cambridge Platform was applied with great success for a few years after its proclamation. Thomas Hutchinson records that the church at Malden was fined by the General Court in 1653 for failure to secure approbation of the surrounding churches in their choice of a minister. Similarly the North Church of Boston was pre-



vented from calling a certain minister because the court looked upon him as an "illiterate man." Three years later a committee of elders was appointed to solve internal difficulties in the Sudbury Church.<sup>9</sup> But as the century drew to a close this interference was gradually relaxed. After the arrival of the new charter in 1691, the General Court refused to appoint a commission to solve difficulties in the church at Salem. In the years to follow they frequently appointed arbitrators to mediate disputes, but these arbitrators now had only the power to advise and not to compel.<sup>10</sup>

### The Rights of the Local Church

In 1690, the colony witnessed the reestablishment of regular meetings of ministers. The early records of the colony are replete with instances of these meetings, but by 1672 they seem to have disappeared, for Thomas Shepard remarked that he remembered such gatherings in his childhood and there were "hundreds yet living who could remember the ministers meetings in the several towns. . . ."<sup>11</sup> It was such a group of ministers that promulgated the *Proposals* of 1705. These *Proposals* advocated "that the Ministers of the Country form themselves into Associations. . . ." and "that Advice be taken by the Associated Pastors from time to time, e're they Proceed to any action in their Particular Churches. . . ." Feeling that this was not enough restriction on local autonomy, they decided that no church should accept a minister without his previously being sanctioned by the association. But the provision that stirred the local church advocates the most was that the determinations of the associations were to be looked upon "as final and decisive."<sup>12</sup>

Such proposals would have received ready acclamation during the first generation of the colony, but now they were in complete opposition to the desires of many of the churches and the people. Not only were the outlying areas unaccustomed to central control, but even in the town of Boston the conservatives received opposition. The Brattle Street Church had been formed a few years previously without the aid or consent of other churches. Increase Mather attacked them in no uncertain terms for this unruly method

but the Brattle Street Church outlived the imprecations of the conservatives.

Although John Wise's first book did not appear until five years after those *Proposals*, and therefore had little influence in defeating them, this should not be taken as a measure of the value of the book. The book transcends the issue of the *Proposals*, and it becomes an early statement of the inchoate democracy taking rise in the colony. This book, *The Churches Quarrel Espoused*, was followed seven years later by another book on *The Vindication of the Government of New England Churches*.

Wise's first book, although it makes occasional references to natural law, fails to work out the doctrine in any logical form, and it is devoted mainly to a dissertation on the past history of the church in Massachusetts. He shows consummate skill in introducing quotations from Cotton Mather praising the state of the church. "Here is a temple built, more glorious than Solomon's," says Mather, "not of dead stones, but living saints; which may tempt the greatest queen of Sheba to come and see, and allure even kings from far to come and worship in. Therefore, as to their government, sirs, do not spoil it, oh, destroy it not! there is a blessing in it." Wise however points out to the people that despite Mather's earnest solicitude for the church, the *Proposals* were "a bold attempt indeed, not only to despoil the house of some particular piece of furniture, but to throw it quite out a window; not only to take away some of its ornaments, but to blow up its foundations."<sup>13</sup> It is quite clear that each man was absolutely sincere in his ideas concerning the church, and it is also plainly evident that each held a different conception of the Cambridge Platform. Cotton Mather wished to inaugurate the system that had prevailed during the *early* years of the colony. John Wise looked upon the Platform as he had seen it in operation in the *later* development of the colony.

### **Rev. John Wise, Student of the People**

This minister from the Chebacco parish appears to have been a keen student of the Massachusetts people. He was aware of their innate conservative qualities, and in his book



he played upon these with great ability. For generations the clergy had thundered from the pulpit that the Massachusetts Congregational Church was divinely instituted by God. This belief had penetrated into the very marrow of the people's life, and once any plan could be labeled as in opposition to God's will, it was sure to be defeated by the combined action of the clergy and the people. Thus Anne Hutchinson and the Quakers were dispatched with few regrets. Wise was quick to take advantage of this, and he played this belief before the eyes of the people, when he wrote: "As to immediate inspiration, I must needs presume, these gentlemen will not dare to assert, that they are sent immediately from God with this message to the churches; they are too good and wise to pretend . . . to immediate vision, or a spirit of prophecy; both the matter and manner of their writing sufficiently convinces that these proposals are their own sentiments. . . ." <sup>14</sup>

### The "Government of the Church by Classes"

Wise apparently knew that this appeal to the emotions was his safest line of attack. Not only did he accuse the *Proposals* of being man-made, but he further beclouded the issue with an implication that they "smell very strong of the infallible chair." For he wrote: "Indeed, at the first cast of the eye, the scheme seems to be the spectre or ghost of Presbyterianism, or the government of the church by classes; yet if I don't mistake in intention there is something considerable of prelacy in it, only the distinct courts of bishops, with the steeples of the churches, tythes, surplice, and other ornaments, do not shew themselves so visible, as to be discerned at the first look, yet with a microscope you may easily discern them really to be there. . . ." <sup>15</sup> The Massachusetts Puritans not only had a deep hatred of Catholicism due to traditional belief, but this hatred was amplified by the French menace on their border, and Wise made the most of this situation.

John Wise was likewise aware that the people were inordinately proud of their heritage. He, therefore, devoted his energies to proving that Mather's desires would change settled ways of life. "This is plain," he wrote, "they take

away the liberties, privileges, discipline, and government of these churches, all of which are established to them by law. . . .<sup>16</sup> And why permit this to come about for "there is no such spot of earth in the earthly globe (so belaboured with family devotion, reading God's word, catechizing, and well instructing youth, with neat and virtuous examples and divine prayers . . . not out of books, but out of hearts, the solemnizing sabbaths and family attendance on public means) as in *New England*. And if so, then what need have we of this late invention?"<sup>17</sup> Wise concludes the book with a flashing piece of satire. He writes that men harboring such designs on the church government should "spend the time in catching flies, rather than contrive how to subvert or alter the government in the churches, by such despotic measures especially in an empire and province so charmed with such enchanting liberties as ours are."

From 1710 to 1717 there was little danger of the *Proposals* of 1705 being instituted. Wise was busy during this period in developing his politico-religious philosophy into an adequate form of expression. In 1717 *The Vindication of the Government of New England Churches* was offered to the public. This *Vindication* of the congregational form of church government was based on natural law, the Holy Scripture, and the precedent of the church of antiquity. It is in the development of the doctrine of natural law that Wise marks an advance over the men of his times. He records his indebtedness to Pufendorf's *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* of 1672, but he appears to have been unaware of John Locke.<sup>18</sup>

### Government "Not of Divine Institution"

Man, according to Wise, was at the outset in a natural state of being, but since he could not subsist without society he entered into a compact with his fellow men. Government was therefore the result "of human free compacts and not of divine institution; it is the produce of man's reason, of human and rational combinations, and not from any direct orders of infinite wisdom. . . ."<sup>19</sup> Although this apparently disavows any influence of God, Wise did not escape completely from the congregational ideology. He wrote



that it is agreeable that we attribute civil government to God "whether we receive it nextly from reason or revelation, for that each is equally an emanation of his wisdom. . . ."<sup>20</sup> Thus, Wise took upon himself the difficult task of reconciling the social compact with the omnipotence of God. He came at that difficult period in Massachusetts history when the doctrine of God's predestination was still important, but—at the same time—when a new spirit of free will was beginning to shatter the old beliefs.

### Man Is "Equal to Every Other Man"

Continuing his discussion of the doctrine he declared that man in the state of nature is equal to every other man. When man has turned his rights over to the state, ". . . then his personal liberty and equality is to be cherished, and preserved to the highest degree, as will consist with all just distinctions amongst men of honor, and shall be agreeable with the public good." No one can assume sovereignty over another until an agreement has been entered into.<sup>21</sup> That Wise clearly believed in government by the consent of the governed can be seen from what he had written in 1710: "There is no doubt or question to be made, but that the ministers and pastors of Christ's churches may meet in greater or lesser numbers; for they are masters of themselves, and no more accountable how they spend their time, than other men are; but to meet at certain times & places, as political incorporate bodies, or in the form of classes, for the exercise and management of government, this must be determined by some precept issued from a legislative power; and without this, such who give the advice, and exhibit the call, are very despotic and arbitrary. . . ."<sup>22</sup>

In order to justify democracy in church government Wise analyzes the various forms of civil government. After discussing democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy he concluded that the mixed form of England's government, "settled upon a noble democracy as its basis," was by far the best. Therefore, he said, ". . . the several examples of civil states (England, Holland, and Venice), which I have named, do serve abundantly to justify the noble nature of our constitution in church-order; for that the several famous and august

nations which I have mentioned, in all their glory at home, and success in arms and trade abroad; their several governments which have brought them to see all this, are either a perfect democracy, or very much mixed and blendished with it."<sup>23</sup>

### The People's Right to Revolt

Wise followed these statements on government by the consent of the governed with the idea of the right to revolution. The people have a legitimate right to revolt if the rulers to whom they have decreed sovereignty should grow arbitrary and overstep their limitations. This he applied to "particular men in their rebellions or usurpations in church or state," meaning, of course, the proponents of the *Proposals* of 1705. He also included Governor Edmund Andros under that classification, and thereby justified his opposition to the government of the Dominion of New England a few years before.<sup>24</sup> Rulers are thus limited by fundamental law, according to Wise, and they are made responsible to the will of the people. The doctrine of social compact had long been current in the Bay Colony's political theory, for as John Winthrop had written, "it is clearly agreed, by all, that the care of safety and welfare was the original cause or occasion of common weales and of many families subjecting themselves to rulers and laws; for no man hath lawfull power over another, but by birth and consent."<sup>25</sup> However, not only did John Winthrop limit the inherent democracy in such a system by that ominous term "birth," but he declared that magistrates actually received their authority from God and were responsible only to God: "Judges are Gods upon earthe."<sup>26</sup> John Wise, by setting forth the doctrine that the rulers were responsible directly to the people, was making a great step in the advance of democratic government. He did not deny that the office of rulers in its origin was from God, but these rulers received their immediate establishment from the people and they were responsible to the people.<sup>27</sup>

Only indirectly is it possible to discern that the Reverend John Wise was at variance with the doctrine of original sin, inasmuch as his books deal more with church form than



with church dogma. Although he accepted the fact that the world was dominated by an all-seeing God, he looked upon this God as a rational being, who guided mankind to the best things in life. Wise felt "every man is bound to honor every man" and that "the end of all good government is to cultivate humanity, and promote the happiness of all, and the good of every man in all his rights, his life, liberty, estate, honor, &c. . . ." <sup>28</sup> Wise did not use the phrase that *mankind was essentially good*, but his statement that *human nature had dignity* would approach this conception. <sup>29</sup> He felt that God treated man "as a creature of a very honorable character, as free and at his own dispose (*sic!*). Or as though he were some high and mighty state placed at the top of this globe. Therefore he courts him into an alliance as though he were likely to yield great honor to the crown. . . . That certainly if God did not highly estimate man, as a creature exalted, by his reason, liberty and nobleness of nature, he would not caress him as he does in order to his submission; but rather with some peevish and haughty monarch, or the bloody Mahomet, send his demands at the mouth of his canon. But instead of such harsh measures, they are treated with the highest reason, attended with lenity and great acts of condescension." <sup>30</sup> These are the views of a man who knew the people and associated with them day in and day out. The essential goodness of the people would bear itself out in every action. The fact that such an important minister as John Wise preached the dignity of human nature was a harbinger that a more humanistic attitude was soon to sweep through Calvinistic theology. The preacher of the Chebacco parish was a lover of human nature. His belief in the "nobleness" of human nature was a break with the prevailing theological doctrine of the day. Throughout his life he was a warrior for the betterment of mankind and the advancement of democracy.

### Men Must "Judge and Act for Themselves"

An attempt to ascertain his influence must remain largely intangible in nature. There are few records of the books read by the common people; but from the information we have it is safe to allege that his influence was considerable.

John Wise's influence on the future development of the Congregational Church was prodigious. His writings launched a movement that was to bring the church in Massachusetts to the Brownist's conception of each Congregational Church being independent. The work of the first generation of the divines, in reducing this independence to an absurdity, was shattered beyond repair. The principle of a democratic government in the church gradually progressed. In 1738, Cotton Mather's son, Samuel, stated that the people of the church should "never blindly resign themselves to the Direction of their Ministers; but consider themselves, as *Men*, as *Christians*, as *Protestants*, obliged to judge and act for themselves in all the weighty concernments of Religion. . . ."<sup>31</sup> James Sullivan, later to be governor of Massachusetts, demonstrated to what extent Wise's principles had leavened the thinking of the state. In 1796, he wrote in answer to an appeal that individual churches should not be allowed to hire or dismiss their preachers at will; "there needs, however, to be but very little said in order to prove that a church impotent and weak . . . hath a right, beyond all obligation that human laws can lay upon them, to dismiss their pastors when they please. Churches may advise churches, and members may reason with members; but to advise will always suppose that the advice may be accepted or rejected: and should it be rejected, I know not to what earthly tribunal the pastor, as a pastor, could repair with his complaint against his church."<sup>32</sup>

The reprinting of *The Churches Quarrel Espoused* and *The Vindication of the Government of New England Churches* indicates to some extent the author's influences on future generations. In 1772 both were reprinted and issued to the public at the time when opposition to the mother country was assuming ominous proportions. The issue was oversubscribed, and a new one was soon printed. The list of subscribers are appended to the book, and it is noticeable that the laymen outnumber the ministers approximately eight to one. Wise was one of the many writers referred to from the pulpit as New England preachers developed the



idea of natural rights, the social compact, and the right to revolution.<sup>33</sup>

That John Wise did not become the outstanding figure of his generation can be attributed to the fact that he did not write in the fulness of time. He wrote for the struggling democracy of the towns, but this was still too inchoate to grasp the import of his writings. Thomas Paine, unlike John Wise, wrote his *Common Sense* at the propitious moment. The colonial citizens were searching for a justification, and Paine supplied it in a vigorous manner. John Wise wrote vigorously also, but he was too far ahead of his times for all his views to take root. At least it can be said that he added to the barrage that was to be used as democracy moved onward. No more fitting eulogy can be made than the inscription on his tombstone: "For talents, piety, and learning, he shone as a star of the first magnitude."<sup>34</sup>

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Cited by Alice M. Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1928), 22.

<sup>2</sup>Williston Walker, *The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism* (New York, 1893), 466, 467.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay* (L. S. Mayor edition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), I, 303.

<sup>4</sup>Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana* (Silus Andrus edition, Hartford, 1855), I, 437.

<sup>5</sup>"The Cambridge Platform, Walker. *The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, 229, 230, 237.

<sup>6</sup>Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana*, II, 249.

<sup>7</sup>*Ratio Disciplinae* (Boston, 1725), 90. Cited by Henry Martyn Dexter, *The Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years as Seen in Its Literature* (Boston: Harper and Brothers, 1880), 486.

<sup>8</sup>Cited by Perry Miller, *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), 312.

<sup>9</sup>Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay*, I, 161, 356.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 8.

<sup>11</sup>Cited by Walker, *The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, 470.

<sup>12</sup>"Proposals of 1705," Walker, *The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, 487-489.

<sup>13</sup>*The Churches Quarrel Espoused* (2nd edition, Boston, 1772), 100.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 104-105.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>18</sup>*The Vindication of the Government of New England Churches* (2nd edition, Boston, 1772), 22.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>22</sup>*The Churches Quarrel Espoused*, 113.

<sup>23</sup>*The Vindication of the Government of the New England Churches*, 33, 62.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 35. John Wise led the people of Ipswich in a refusal to pay the taxes levied by Governor Andros arguing that the people could be taxed only by a representative assembly. On trial before the Council of the colony, John Wise demanded the privileges of Englishmen according to the Magna Carta. It is interesting to note that in this period he used "the rights of Englishmen," not natural rights, in his arguments. Thomas Franklin Waters, *Ipswich in the Massachusetts Bay Colony* (Ipswich: Ipswich Historical Society, 1905), I, 239-264. See also *Andros Tracts*, *Prince Society Publications*, I, 82, 85-86; John Langdon Sibley, *Biographical Sketches of Graduates of Harvard University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1881), II, 429, calls Wise "the first man in America ever known to oppose the idea of Taxation without Representation."

<sup>25</sup>R. C. Winthrop, *The Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, ii. 182 ff., cited by Stanley Grey, "The Political Thought of John Winthrop" *The New England Quarterly*, III (1930), 682.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 691.

<sup>27</sup>*The Churches Quarrel Espoused*, 91, 88, 90.

<sup>28</sup>*A Vindication of the Government of the New England Churches*, 40.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 44. In order to illustrate that Wise believed in his fellow men, one can point to the petition he drew up at the time of the Salem witchcraft trials, which was signed by the most prominent men of his parish, objecting to the trial of two former residents for being witches. The petition stated that the two individuals never had acted as though they were bewitched. This was a daring protest to write during the witchcraft hysteria. Professor S. E. Morison apparently overlooked it when he wrote that the intellectual class of the colony kept a cowardly silence during the trials. *The Puritan Pronaos, Studies in the Intellectual Life of New England in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1936), 253. In July, 1703, John Wise and eleven other ministers of Essex County petitioned the General Court to clear the names of the accused people. See Waters, *Ipswich in the Massachusetts Bay Colony*, 290-299.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 46-47.

<sup>31</sup>Cited by Dexter, *The Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years*, 501.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 506.

<sup>33</sup>Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution*, 8.

<sup>34</sup>Joseph B. Felt, *History of Ipswich, Essex and Hamilton* (Cambridge: Charles Folsom, 1834), 260.

## *"Be Not the First"*

By LEWIS DEXTER

*What price unorthodoxy? "There is nothing more bothersome . . . than to alter entrenched habits. That is what the innovator wants done when he advocates a new ritual in the church, a new technique in the file department, a new labor saving device in the factory."*

Spoonfuls of salt should always be poured on one of the favorite beliefs of the folklorists of self-help. It is simply not true that ingenuity, inventiveness and a perception of new needs and new devices smooth the way to promotion and pay. In fact, a readiness to recommend reforms is one of the greatest handicaps under which an ambitious apprentice can labor.

The sophist might maintain that the belief, though false, is socially beneficial. Taking the thesis that "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church" as his text, he could point out that, although those who first introduce innovations usually succumb to the slings and arrows of outraged public opinion, sooner or later the more desirable new departures are adopted, precisely as a consequence of the sufferings of their early advocates; and, since no modern man deliberately chooses to be a martyr, it is fortunate indeed that the superstition about the rewards of originality exists, for it causes men to become martyrs in spite of themselves.

However, in fact, the most that one can say with accuracy is that the blood of some martyrs may have been the seed from which some churches have sprung. By the world's standards, at least, such martyrs as the Albigenses of Languedoc, who fell before the orthodox and covetous crusaders of Northern France, during the era of St. Louis, died in vain; and it is open to grave doubt whether the ultimate success of Quakerism is attributable to the willingness of early Quakers to suffer the stake. As Max Weber has suggested in his work on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, perhaps Quakerism really grew in esteem because of the congruence of its doctrines with business-mindedness.



Pure logic, on the other hand, will demonstrate the fallacy, as a general counsel for everybody all of the time, of the old rhyme:

Be not the first by whom the new is tried,  
Nor yet the last by whom the old is laid aside.

But, under what circumstances is it wise to try the new first? As things go, it is often the most intelligent young people who see something that needs to be done and try to do it. They find themselves thrown against stone walls; and, according to temperament and experience, become cynical or embittered.

Perhaps some instruction in the sociology of reform might lessen their sufferings and benefit society through making possible more ready acceptance of new contributions. On the principle, "Forewarned Is Forearmed," potential reformers would study the history of inventors and innovators. They would be told of Semmelweiss who valiantly tried to explain to fellow-physicians how elementary hygiene would reduce deaths at child-birth: and they would be shown how as a consequence, he was ostracized to the point where he sacrificed career, sanity, and life itself. They would study the case of Jonas Hanway, who first introduced the umbrella into England, and have it explained to them why he was mobbed. They would hear of eminent scientists who joined with the lay public in deriding the pioneers of aviation. They would see Servetus, the forerunner of Unitarianism, burned at the stake, and Priestley, scientist and religious thinker, in effect exiled two centuries later by public opposition. They would learn to understand why Roger Williams' "inconvenient questioning of land titles and his views on the Massachusetts charter" led to his banishment into the wilderness where he was "sorely tossed . . . in a bitter winter season, not knowing what bread or bed did mean."

### Cost of Unorthodoxy

And, lest they gather the impression that these are matters of far away and long ago, there would be those to instruct them in the cost of unorthodoxy today. It would be explained that although in the western democracies resort to

physical violence is infrequent, the pressures to conformity are intense. Case studies to document this generalization would be made, case studies, not chiefly from the lives of those now considered heroes, but from the experience of men who, whether rightly or wrongly, are trying to advance the cause of human decency and efficiency today. These case studies would permit them to answer such questions as: What happens to the Negro dentist in some backward areas who tries to dissuade his patients from getting gold teeth if they do not need them? What is the fate of the worker who complains that his trade union's leadership is autocratic? What happens to the little street vendor who sells a magazine which influences, close to the Commissioner of Licenses, distrust? What are the chances of promotion for a private who was formerly a publicist and lets ex-colleagues know of some scandalous situation which has developed in his camp?

Instruction could be carried well beyond the bounds of what we ordinarily think of as civil liberties. Tables might be prepared of the average number of articles accepted by the more reputable academic journals from persons using orthodox scientific methods and terminologies and of the average number accepted from those who utilize a new (and afterwards accepted) method or style; similar tables might be made of the salaries of the former group, as compared with the latter, at the same ages. Studies might be made of certain organizations to see who is promoted when and why; and these will demonstrate that those who accept the accustomed methods of doing business on the whole rise to the top. The careers of physicians who adopt *new and soundly-based* treatments might be examined to see whether they lag behind less progressive men in income; it will be shown that poets who write in a new idiom are retarded in winning recognition.

If these facts are accepted simply as facts, the curriculum just outlined might serve only to discourage potential innovator. But, wisely handled, the insistent question will be: Why did these new ideas meet with so much opposition? How could that opposition have been avoided?

In each case, presumably, the answer will be somewhat different; but certain general conclusions will probably emerge from a study, directed towards answering such questions:<sup>2</sup>

### **Innovators Are Nuisances**

First, students will come to see that most innovators lack completely the ability to see themselves as others see them—which is to say as nuisances. There is nothing more bothersome in the entire world than to alter entrenched habits. That is what the innovator wants done when he advocates a new ritual in the church, a new technique in the file department, or a new labor saving device in the factory. There is nothing more insulting than to imply that the man who does the job does not do it as well as it could be done. This is what the bright employee does when he suggests that the manager employ a new technique of administrative analysis or that statisticians scrap conventional methods of analyzing costs. There is nothing more dreadful than to run the risk of losing prestige. And any significant change in any organization means that some people are likely to be less influential and prominent than they were.<sup>3</sup> When two churches are merged, then there will be only one chairman of a standing committee instead of two; when the United States joins a League of Nations, perhaps individual United States Senators (and especially the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) will feel less important.

The typical inventor appreciates none of these things. He is obsessed with the particular kind of improvement which he can offer; and he regards those who stand in his way as reactionaries or dunderheads.<sup>4</sup> For the most part, to be sure, his opponents disguise their opposition behind well-sounding arguments about the merits of the new proposal. Its sponsors will then waste time in attempting to destroy the rationalizations put forward instead of striking at the real issues. For instance, not one man in ten thousand who cites George Washington's words about "no entangling alliances," is in any sense convinced by them or cares what Washington really means. Some deeper motive of habitual patriotism, or dislike of foreigners, or suspicion of the



British, or desire to see the Senate continue free to reject treaties, is almost surely at work when that immortal cliché is trotted forth. Nor will argument convince the real Jew-baiter that the Protocol of the Elders of Zion is a forgery. He believes in it because deep within him is a need to hate something, and the Jew is a convenient target for the hostilities of which he is especially aware.

Mere awareness of the factors creating opposition to a plan may at least make reformers more charitable towards their opponents, more able to meet them on grounds of genuine tolerance, more perceptive to answer what they mean, and less quick to ridicule what they say. And, in some cases, forethought may enable inventors to see who will lose what in the way of prestige, profit, and entrenched habit, if the proposed plan be adopted; and consequently to have ready some method of allaying fears and soothing injured feelings. A chairman of a standing committee who fears for the loss of his position may be assured that the two churches which merge will back him for a post in the state conference; suggestions for the introduction of labor-saving devices, or the elimination of conductors on buses, may be accompanied by schemes for retaining ousted men.

There is another motive, frequently present in resistance to change, of which the typical innovator is unaware. Schiller has expressed it thus:

For, of the wholly common is man made  
And custom is his nurse. Woe then to them  
That lay irreverent hands upon his old  
House furniture, the dear inheritance  
From his forefathers, for time consecrates  
And what is gray with age becomes the sacred.

The typical innovator has no sympathy with such sentiments. Accordingly, to those who have grown up in some old-fashioned way of doing business, reform seems to be (and in fact sometimes is so handled that it really is) nothing but an excuse for more or less refined sadism. Anthony Trollope in *The Warden* presents an extremely touching picture of the sufferings which a reform may impose upon those who have grown into the old order of things.

Few innovators see, either, that frequently they suffer not so much because of their good ideas as because of their total personalities. That is to say, the kind of man who develops something new is apt to be relatively insensitive to customary courtesies in many respects. For personalities tend to be more or less integrated; and unorthodoxy in one field is apt to be accompanied by unorthodoxies in others. It is characteristic that several potential donors to a project for reducing the chances of war were unwilling to give anything when they observed that the leading advocate to the idea had dirty fingernails. He himself was not aware of this; he does not care about appearance. But they could not judge his ideas; they could judge his cleanliness. And so they refused to support his plan. So, in larger matters too, the man with a new vision is apt to be unconventional. Priestley was born an original scientist and a deviant religious thinker; had he confined himself to one occupation or the other he might have been safer than in fact he was. Veblen was not only a scoffer at classical economics; he was personally sarcastic.

### Innovations and Military Planning

It is imperative that embryo innovators realize that the chances are they are wrong in any original suggestion which they advance. This does not mean that original suggestions should not be advanced. It does mean, however, that men should make sure they know why things are done the way they are done before they propose different procedure.<sup>5</sup> Amateur strategists who ignore problems of supply and transport can always evolve paper-brilliant plans because they do not recognize that effective planning must be *organismic*. That is to say, a new proposal or innovation must fit both into the limitations imposed by the attitudes and values of those who have to adopt it. Military critics, like Winston Churchill and Liddell Hart, have justly pointed out that the Allied commanders in the last war made a great mistake in not using the tank intelligently; but there *had* to be a change in the cautious, infancy-minded thinking of the high command, before they could use the tank properly. It is, in fact, almost axiomatic that no genuinely new weapon will be used

effectively because it takes time for generals to readjust their conceptions of military propriety to its possibilities.

Similarly, it might be desirable in the United States to adopt many features of Russian or German military organization; but, in fact, such adoption would presuppose a change in the attitudes and values of American officers and men. Or, in every congregation, and in every university, one may notice many, many needed changes; but always, always, the man who first tries to introduce such changes "fails", because he tries to *impose* them upon persons whose attitudes and values are adjusted to the previous situation. Sometimes a leader who recognizes the necessity for a democratic educational process can, more or less slowly, get people to alter their attitudes and values. Corey, in a brilliant article on the nature of educational leadership,<sup>6</sup> which should be carefully considered by all would-be innovators, has shown how this may be done; but in other cases it is probably necessary to admit that, without a total reorganization of society, it is inconceivable in a measurable period of time, that one's proposals can be effectuated.

Finally, there should be emphasis upon the fact that no new approach can stand on its own merits. The use of influence and pressure are just as important in getting inventions and reforms accepted as in anything else. Kelvin started his academic career by trying to obtain publication for a paper which offended one of the leaders of his profession; but Kelvin's father, himself a well-known scholar, succeeded in smoothing the matter over. Mendel, on the other hand, undertook experiments which are basic to the whole science of genetics; but, published as they were, obscurely, they lay unnoticed until his methods were rediscovered about thirty years later.

This suggests that the apprentice innovator should learn not to come forth with proposals until he has undertaken an analysis of the situation and prepared a plan of campaign. An isolated article or act will either be ignored or considered scandalous, according to its nature, and will but rarely lead to any wider understanding. The innovator must know—after the first shot is fired—what is to be done



next; who in relevant professions or organizations can be expected or persuaded, for whatever motives, to support the new departure. Who can understand what is actually being attempted? What alternative means of winning a livelihood are open to those who take the risks? What friendships may they expect to lose, what temptations to unhappiness and bitterness must they be prepared to avoid?

Were such insight into the sociology of innovation widely provided, there might be fewer mute, inglorious Mendels, fewer potential Semmelweisses, hindered so completely by popular or professional disapproval, that they make no effective contribution to human progress at all.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>The major theme of this article might be stated somewhat differently. It could read: Statesmen, ministers, scholars, and citizens, are continually faced with the problem of compromise. This does not mean that they must resolve a general abstract dilemma: To compromise or not to compromise? On the contrary, in any concrete instance the question which they must answer is: What is the optimum degree of compromise in this particular situation? (Note, please, that the possible range of compromise is from 0% to 100%).

When confronted with practical problems, political theorists, church social action leaders, scientific administrators, etc., tend to analyze them casuistically; but when they discuss social action theoretically, they are apt to be dogmatic. Note, for example, the scholar who asserts that he will let *nothing* interfere with complete freedom of research, publication, and teaching. Among political theorists, in particular, there has been a continuing tradition of revolt against the futility of such absolutism.

Among the outstanding critics of conventional political theory, one might name Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Lord Halifax, the author of the *Character of a Trimmer* (flourished 1690). An outstanding modern example is E. Pendleton Herring's *Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940).

As a student of Herring's, the writer found himself forced into a position where James A. Farley became more admirable than Senator Norris, or Governor Bricker than Wendell Willkie.

This means that one sacrifices moral considerations in evaluating political realities, or that one relies with Herring upon some unformulated limitation which enables the honest man to distinguish between legitimate compromise and illegitimate opportunism. J. H. Hallowell, taking T. V. Smith, whose position is entirely analogous to Herring's, as his target, has given a largely antitheical criticism of the philosophy of compromise in *Ethics*. The present article attempts rather to synthesize the sense of reality, which is to be found in the works of Halifax and Herring, with the vivid awareness of such moralists as William Lloyd Garrison and John Haynes Holmes that compromise can all too often be used simply as an excuse to avoid trouble and to let evil flourish unchecked.

This article arose too out of the writer's concern with a related problem, well illustrated in David Lindsay Watson's *Scientists Are Human*. Watson demonstrates that the original thinker—the scholar who looks for new methods or utilizes new techniques—is likely to handicap himself in terms of his own career as compared with his conventionally-minded brethren. But science taken as a whole will grow precisely because of unorthodox discoveries

and to known truths. What then is the obligation of the young scientist if he finds himself interested in borderline topics or unfamiliar methods?

<sup>2</sup>Such a work as William F. Ogburn's, *Social Change*, New York, 1922, might be used as a major text here. (The most explicit criticism of Ogburn is furnished by Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, 1944, especially appendixes 1 and 2).

<sup>3</sup>The fact that administrative analysts and industrial engineers are not often aware of the sociological factors in change makes them (and such ecclesiastical equivalents as commissions of appraisal) extremely impotent, in many situations.

<sup>4</sup>A prig has been defined as one who judges other people, not by their standards, but by his.

<sup>5</sup>Students should of course learn that there is a danger of developing the academic attitude which consists of delaying action until all the facts are in, knowing that all the facts never will be in. In other words, they must learn to set a time limit upon the period for reflection and analysis.

<sup>6</sup>Stephen Corey, "Cooperative Staff Work," *School Review*, 52 (1944) 336-345. See also Marshall Dimock, "Bureaucracy Self-Examined", *Public Administration Review*, 4, 1944, 197-207, for an analysis of the way in which the executive is limited by his subordinates' preconceptions and preferences. A comprehensive discussion of the organic nature of society is to be found in Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*, New York, 1934.

It should not be concluded from the above statement that it is necessarily an error to try to impose a new arrangement upon a group or institution. It may be that this is sometimes the best way to educate them; but the innovator should undertake an advance analysis of the different possible ways of proceeding, and decide whether it is likely to be more effective to go so far as to have to retreat, or to proceed more slowly and comprehensively along the line suggested by Corey.

## *Religious Naturalism in Chile*

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By JOHN H. HERSHEY

*Introducing a South American thinker who sees man's spirit as the flowering of his "creative activity . . . in the midst of the obscure and intermingled forces" of our natural world.*

Just as in the United States, so in various Latin-American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and others, representatives of a broad, liberal, humanistic attitude toward life have influenced religious thinking. This is true also of the republic of Chile. In the past, the Chilean, Juan Enrique Lagarrigue (1852-1921), for example, was a fervent exponent of a humanistic philosophy. He not only wrote books about "religion of humanity," but penned letters on the subject to many persons. Supernatural theology, he held, should be replaced by a religion conceived as "sociology inspired by altruism." "The proper function of religion consists evidently in guiding the individual in complete convergence toward the good of society with regard to feeling, thinking, and acting." Writing during the first World War, he urged that all countries "fraternize always in the glorious labor of universal civilization." Achieving the good within society and establishing peace among nations were the chief teachings of Lagarrigue who felt with enthusiasm that he had a message to proclaim from the housetops.

At the present time an outstanding Chilean intellectual leader who proposes a rational and humanistic interpretation of the spiritual life is Enrique Molina. Since 1919 he has been president and professor of philosophy at the University of Concepcion in the city of that name. In 1941 he was honored by being received as an academic member of the Faculty of Philosophy and Education at the University of Chile in Santiago, the capitol. This honor is bestowed on educators having behind them a long period of distinguished service. Such an educator is Molina who was born in La Serena, Chile, in 1871. Speaking of him at the reception noted above, Dr. Claudio Rosales said: "His



cardinal virtue is, without doubt, that of being professor. The other facets of his personality are aspects of this virtue. It caused him to depreciate the cajoleries and secret callings of medicine and law, which offered him a larger economic income and a greater standing within conventional society and politics."

The Chilean professor has made more than one visit to the United States. Commissioned by the Government of Chile he visited numerous universities from October, 1918, to June, 1919, in order to investigate their structure and function. The institutions he studied included universities in the West, the Middle West, the East, and elsewhere. In his book, *De California a Harvard*, he discusses administration, subject-matter, student life, and other aspects and functions of universities generally. They occupy, he says, an eminent place in the cultural life of the United States, and compare advantageously with the best in the world. Latin Americans, he writes, can learn from these universities, first, not to be too easily prejudiced into thinking that the North American country is without capacity or interest for cultural activity, and secondly, not to be too complacent about their own "Latin spirituality." Molina's most recent visit to the United States was in 1940. On this trip he attended by invitation the eighth American Scientific Congress held in Washington, D. C., in May of that year.

### **Finding the Spiritual in the Human**

During Molina's long career he has written many books on themes of education, culture and philosophy. A recent book considered to be his chief work and published in 1937, is *De lo Espiritual en la Vida Humana* (*Of the Spiritual in Human Life*). The rich fruitage of the author's years of experience and reflection, this volume contains a wealth of allusions to ancient and modern history and thought, and a treasure of ideas and insights. His book, Molina explains, is not for those who already have a firm belief in a spiritual world, but for seekers and even skeptics. Its aim is not to find the meaning of the universe, but is the more modest one of discovering the significance of the spiritual in our human existence. The following account gives some of the

author's main conclusions about progress, the spiritual element in life, and the "new humanism."

In considering human progress, Molina lists and discusses in some detail the various causes that have been assumed to bring it about. They are geography, race, economic conditions, institutions like the family and the state, idealistic or intellectual causes, religion, education. He points out that any one of these causes has been made the sole or chief cause by some thinkers, as for example, economic conditions as interpreted by those accepting historical materialism. Molina believes all these causes form a complex of forces intercrossing and operating simultaneously. He classifies them into two main groups: First, the physical, such as climate, race, economic conditions. Of the last, he writes, "Economic antecedents form a current in the ocean of history, but not the entire ocean." Secondly, cultural causes, like education, art, morality, religion. Professor Molina then explains in some detail what he considers to be the true principles of progress, seven in number: (1) "Progress is rarely manifested at any one time in all orders of activity, and it is not usually common to all peoples in a given epoch." It is not in a straight line, but occurs in zigzag fashion. (2) "Progress depends on the previous state of society." Racial inheritance and social heritage condition the advance of a people. (3) "Different social functions influence one another reciprocally, but the action of the most fundamental is the greatest." Economic conditions may bring about changes in artistic production, but the latter will not usually modify the former in an equal manner. (4) "Definitive progress, the constitution of the ideal city in which there are no changes, is a chimera." Perpetual change and not permanent fixity is the rule. (5) "It is not possible to infer social deductions about society with the precision of the mathematical sciences, astronomy, physics, chemistry." This is because social life is too complex. (6) "Progress is in direct ratio to the domination of man over nature, and in inverse ratio to the domination or exploitation of man by man." There is, however, an exception to the second part of this principle, as in the case of an oppressed people ris-

ing in rebellion to end oppression and to gain its rights. (7) "Without effort there is no progress." Not only the labor of the scientist and the artist but also that of the ordinary, honest worker has value. "Laboring with love, the human soul can find that which philosophers call the infinite in the finite." Molina emphasizes that basic to all progress in any field, material or cultural, is the new idea used for the good of man.

### **Spirit, Body, Expressive of Same Entity**

The Chilean philosopher also interprets the nature of the human spirit and the meaning of the spiritual from a natural and social, rather than a supernatural, standpoint. The spirit is not thought of as pure substance, separate from the body, but in union with it. Spirit and body are the expressions of the same entity or process. The nature of the spirit of man is found in human life itself. "It is the flower of our creative activity which in concrete form is incorporated in works and in abstract form in values." He writes in more detail as follows: "Our own spirit is manifested when we think, reflect, establish judgments, find a new idea, delight in beauty, practise control over ourselves, check our appetites, seek truth, cultivate sentiments of goodness, justice, and love." Spiritual life is expressed in three ways: First, it is found in the individual who possesses ideals and sentiments such as are expressed in the foregoing quotation. Secondly, it is manifest in institutions. Values of truth and beauty and fellowship are embodied in human associations, as schools, churches and other forms of social life. Thus the spiritual is not something merely subjective in the individual, but is in a sense objective as well. Thirdly, spiritual values are incorporated in material things, as statues, buildings, paintings. In this manner the spiritual is conserved.

Professor Molina concludes his book with observations about an "integral culture," and a "new humanism." The possibilities of such a culture and humanism in our day are based not only on a study of the ancient Greek and Roman classics, but also on an appreciation of modern classics represented by Pascal, Shakespeare, Goethe and



even present-day writers. He says a vast field is offered us by modern letters for the "cultivation of the spirit." But he emphasizes that the new humanism is more than literary; it must include moral values. Specialists are necessary, but their danger is one-sidedness. They need to have within themselves the "vibrations of humanity." An integral culture ought to mean a synthesis of the great human values. A new humanism should make for greater understanding among men. Although Molina is concerned mostly in his book with man and his values, he suggests in the following passage a way of understanding the relation of man to the universal energy:

"We conceive indeed an energy conditioned by its own principles, from which condition the order of nature results; an energy in perpetual action. . . . But the creations of the spirit are only potential in this energy. In order to realize them, superior organic forms must be produced, which on our little planet are none other than human forms. From our small place of observation, we cannot see anything like man elsewhere in the universe. The stars with the admirable arrangements of their movements and the marvel of their light, move like obedient masses, but blind and silent to the energy which commands them and penetrates all. Trees, springs, beautiful winged birds, all animals, are also obedient and blind figurants of the universal energy. It calls forth only in man reactions directed toward the search for consciousness of itself. There are marvels of sky and earth; but only man can appreciate them and reflect them in the mirror of his equations of truth and his works of beauty. Without the intention, in venturing this idea, of being guilty of a digression or of the sin of finality, it seems to us that the senses of man surpass the significance of personal organs, that they have cosmic value, and are like windows open in order that the world can behold itself and give itself an account of its own reality. . . . Man has the arduous destiny of appearing in the midst of the obscure and intermingled forces of the world, as a cooperator of creation, as a vortex to which secret currents converge for lighting in him the lamps of the spirit."

## *Spinoza Redivivus*

By HARRY SLOCHOWER

*"If slavery, rudeness, desolation are to be called peace, then is peace the most wretched state of mankind." Spinoza.*

Heinrich Mann has observed that the present hurly-burly is producing a more austere type of thought. That, he adds, is "the unintentional benefit conferred by the debauchees of power madness . . . Their blatant crimes are quietly accompanied by a promising strengthening of human conscience. And, in the end, it is conscience that decides. The only 'world conquests' are those of conscience."

This phenomenon tends to be obscured by the more direct evidence of existing discord. Yet, the estrangement of the physical situation not only produces mental and spiritual estrangement, it also fans the quest for unity and communication. "The age of fundamentals is returning," says a character in Malraux's *Man's Hope*, even as he is engaged in the international war in Spain. The very crumbling of conventional pillars frees the vision toward basic categories.

This complex illumines the contemporary resurgence of humanistic *Substance* thinking in all camps excepting the melancholy and boisterous followers of a temporal opportunism for whom any attempt at first moral principles becomes "totalitarian." The thought is gradually breaking through that *the latest may not be the best* and that "old fashioned" ideas may have more immediate relevance than perishable vogues. This situation helps to explain the growing preoccupation with Spinoza in the last score of years. In the midst of "blitz" styles, smart logicians and quick positivists, the quiet deliberation and sobriety of Spinoza's technique have a refreshing appeal.

Three centuries separate us from Spinoza. Yet, despite this historic differential, the problems of Spinoza's age have pertinent bearing on our distraught epoch. Spinoza lived in an age of transition. Transition periods tend to make exiles of those who do not cling tenaciously to the old, and of those who do not readily jump on the latest bandwagon.

Spinoza could do neither, for his thought and his psychology were dialectical. He has been called "the last of the Mediaevalists," and he has been acclaimed as a modern rationalist. He was neither altogether the one nor the other. In his own time he was attacked by conservative theologians as well as by the Cartesian rationalists and by Leibniz.

Spinoza's personal exile was deepened by the fact that he was a Jew. His people were refugees from the Spanish Inquisition, and the land they fled to offered the Jews polite but restricted freedom. Nor did Spinoza enjoy even the "status" of the Jewish exile. Unable to accept the orthodox conception of the deity and of immortality, he was excommunicated from the Jewish Church. Similar heresies—in particular, his persuasion that God has a body—exposed him to attack by the non-Jewish orthodoxy as an atheist and a materialist. Finally, his stand on freedom of speech stamped him as a political rebel. Spinoza was therefore an outcast from his own people, the Christian community and the political oligarchy.

### **The Relationship of Man and Nature**

While he lived in relative physical seclusion, the life of his mind sought to reestablish its relationship to the world of man and of nature. Poised between the mediaeval conception of Spirit and the Renaissance notion of Nature, Spinoza tried to show that both were aspects of a fundamental unity. He called it Substance, or God. But Spinoza's God, as Joseph Ratner has pointed out, bears a marked relation to the spirit of modern science in that His essence consists in eternal necessity. The existence of God means that there is order and law in the universe. Chance, miracles, indetermination are disallowed, and to the extent that "man thinks" (one of Spinoza's fundamental axioms), he can comprehend this order and thus tread with firm steps on the earth. So strong was Spinoza's belief in the unity and rationality of the world that he deliberately applied the geometric method to ethics and the emotions. Man's behavior and his psychology are subject to the laws which govern physical phenomena. Such were Spinoza's modern persuasions.



To be sure, Spinoza's system bears marks of the past out of which it emerged: remnants of scholasticism and the mediaeval homage to a static absolute. Although Spinoza allows for motion, it remains eternal and constant for him as for Descartes. Change, the temporal-historical process, leads but an illegal existence in Spinoza's rigidly controlled and finished universe. In his stress on order, Spinoza slights uniqueness. In his apotheosis of universal substance he understates the case for particularity. In his effort to show that man's happiness lies in the contemplation of the rational, he almost approaches the later Hegelian notion that the real is the rational. The possibility of happiness issuing from changing the less real to the more real is granted mainly for the individual self, but hardly for social movements. Spinoza did make the distinction between reality and existence, and identified the former only with perfection. Hence he could, with consistency, urge political reforms. Yet, his desire for "good-will" led him to extend the principle of tolerance to the toleration of unjust toleration, even though the individual be thereby "compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels to be the best."

The vitality of Spinoza's doctrine depends, however, on a *translation* of its method and temper. When Spinoza declared man to be determined by nature, he offered the basis for viewing man's culture and his emotive reactions in terms of natural processes. Nor is there a Spinozistic inconsistency to widen the term "nature" to include the social dialectic. And Spinoza's determinism not only permits but calls for social freedom. In a free commonwealth, he wrote, "it should be lawful for every man to think what he will and speak what he thinks." The ultimate aim of government is "not to rule, or restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience but, contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security." He was for peace, but he recognized that peace might be gained at the price of inner war. "If slavery, rudeness, and desolation are to be called peace, then is peace the most wretched state of mankind."

Here is where Spinoza's distinction between freedom and necessity assumes permanent relevance. Spinoza denies freedom of will, but he distinguishes between determination by our own natures and subjection to outside forces which do violence to our nature. Freedom, for Spinoza, consists in *self-expression* (checked by reason), slavery in *self-suppression* (by alien forces). Freedom is possible only in obedience to the laws of nature. Yet, the mind can control nature by comprehending it. Anticipating Hegel and Marx—without the latter's reactive dynamics—Spinoza taught that freedom consists in the recognition of necessity.

### Freedom to Recognize Necessity

Spinoza's doctrine of the order and connection of things and ideas is a wholesome antidote to the discontinuities and time-philosophies prevalent today. In relating spirit to nature it offers wise caution to those captivated by disembodied spiritualisms. Spinoza's vision of a unified universe serves to chasten breathless pragmatisms and political bohemianism. And, as against the hectic expansionism of our shrieking "heroes," Spinoza's life shows that simpler routine can bring quiet dignity and happiness. The serene biography of this man, ostracized by his community, rejecting offers of honor and power, is a heartening example in a time of power-motivations and raucous anthropomorphisms. Writing in a similar temper, Morris R. Cohen reminds us in "*Reason and Nature*" that "vision is itself a good greater than the perpetual motion without any definite direction which moderists regard as the blessed life."

In his own day Spinoza was rejected as a disbeliever. A century and a half later, under the stimulus of Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Coleridge, Spinoza came to be regarded as "God-intoxicated" and as "theissimum and christianissimum." Today, such tribute again comes forth from many, among whom George Santayana is the more illustrious instance. It is also significant that Einstein's cosmology, with its eternal net-work of events occurring in space-time intervals which are invariant for all observers, has been termed "Spinozistic." To be sure, the philosophy of our time must

contain the element of process and of individuation which Spinoza underemphasized. At the same time, we might bear in mind that in stressing man's limitations, Spinoza opened the way not only for the "intellectual love of God," but also for the human love of finite man. For the limited and the wanting are in especial need of love.



## *"Of Thy Dust We Are Fashioned"*

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AN EDITORIAL

The Journal of Liberal Religion presents with this issue two responsive readings adapted from non-scriptural sources. Both emerge from the intellectual acceptance of the earth in its larger cosmic setting, as the cradle and dwelling place of man's spirit. Both express a deep emotional response to this acceptance. There is no negative note speaking here. There is, of course, a clear recognition of the frustrations men must overcome, the tragedies they must endure and sublimate, and the tasks to which they must commit themselves; but the tone is affirmative throughout. "Fighters for the good we are," says Lysaght, "and thou art our battlefield. This is our earthwatch and we have come to relieve the weary ones." And in the words of the unidentified writer, "man is not made to mourn, man is made to hope, to love, to inquire, to achieve." Moreover, "in common tasks are these to be established; in brotherhood life's glories must be found."

Each writer imparts a sense of intimacy with the cosmic reality which touches life at every point:

*O Green Earth! Of thy dust we are fashioned;  
Nursed in thy shelter, thou art our home.*

*Again,*

*Wonders await thee, O Man! Thy universe is thine!  
The stars are symbols of thy lighth and truth;  
The sun thy emblem of sustaining power.*

Can it be doubted that these are expressions of the deepest tides of religious faith? And is it not a pity that organized religion has been content to deprive itself of the opportunity of giving congregational expression to such thoughts and emotions? And is it not conceivable that even the unlearned and the young can grasp the significance and the power of a faith thus rooted and thus expressed?

The ancients tapped the deep and mighty tides of life which flowed in their day, even those that sprang from "secular" sources; and in future issues of The Journal there will be adaptations from their writings too. In our own times however, we have source-springs of information and inspi-

ration—thanks to the accumulated knowledge and experience of the centuries—which the ancients never knew. These have made possible new insights into the reality of the world and man's relation to it. Religion must avail itself of these insights, and must glorify them in music and poetry, to say nothing of the other arts. And unless religion does this it cannot hope to continue to capture the interest nor claim the loyalty of modern man.

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### *A Significant Announcement*

Beginning with the winter issue of THE JOURNAL OF LIBERAL RELIGION, Rev. Vincent B. Silliman, 89—25 190th Street, Hollis 7, New York, will take over the responsibility of editing our new Department of Original Service Materials. It would be impossible to find anywhere in America a man better qualified to direct such an editorial undertaking. Long a seeker for and a creator of new forms of religious expression, Mr. Silliman proved his exceptional worth as associate editor of the Beacon Song and Service Book, published by the Beacon Press in 1935. This book won nation-wide recognition for its pioneering achievement.

THE JOURNAL considers it a mark of distinction to include Mr. Silliman on its staff of editors. His coming is a promise that the new department which he will direct will provide a continuing stream of indispensable materials for use in many kinds of religious services.

## *Thou Earth Art Our Home*

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(Adapted from "The Earth Watch", by S. R. Lysaght, and printed by permission of the Macmillan Publishing Company)

World of our awakening! Our home in the depths of the infinite, fallen to humanity! Oh thou sunlighted wanderer in vast spaces, eternal and limitless!

We thy children, dwelling upon thy bosom, have come to behold thee as our inheritance. Others before us have come and have gone, have beheld and have inherited,

They made of thy waters a path, and of thy forest and meadowland a home. They gathered to toil in the dawn, and to rest in the darkness; and now we, too, have come to make thee our dwelling place.

Intimate art thou, and friendly the paths of our wandering, They lead us afar until they merge into the mists of the infinite,

Wondrous, too, with meaning inborn, the vast creation about thee, bearing the mark of the eternal.

Our life with thee is our earth-watch; we have come to relieve the weary ones, and this has been given to us: to look through the past upon the life of mankind, and to learn its meaning;

Learn that they watched not in vain who received not the recompense; learn that they fought not in vain who beheld not the victory; learn that the law of life is development.

O green earth; of thy dust we are fashioned, nursed in thy shelter, thou art our home,

Deep in our souls are whispers mysterious, promises of goals as yet undiscovered, new shores to be discerned, far fields to be harvested.

Thou hast made us brothers, all, learners of life—lovers, too—and thou art our trysting place; fighters for the good we are, and thou art our battlefield. This is our earth-watch, and we have come to relieve the weary ones

What is beyond we do not know; but there is born in us the hope for victory; and we know that we can be true, and undaunted, and resolute.

Keeping our hearts strong against evil, and warm to each other, we stand as a watch on the shores of the infinite.



## *Humanity's Dwelling Place*

(Adapted from an unknown source.)

O Man of the Earth, deny not the deep voices within you, as you pause amidst pillage and slaughter to consider life's meaning and its goal.

**Uncertain is life, endless are its problems, bitter its frustrations, overwhelming its defeats.**

The perils of fire and storm beset us; by ills of body and of mind we are assailed; the tensions of the world goad mankind to enmity and strife.

Ten thousand times ten thousand have fallen, as the catastrophes of nature and the wrath of man have stalked abroad in bloodshed and destruction.

In sorrow and in tears has man beheld the harvest; in fearful resignation has he said that "man was made to mourn."

**By the sweat of his brow has he toiled for his needs; in his insufficiency has he hoped for nature's bounty.**

The weak have labored for the strong—the many for the few—to stay the pangs of hunger, to find shelter from the cold.

**Age after age has man labored and aspired, and, with prayers unanswered and hopes denied, has said that "man was made to mourn."**

Seeking love, man learns to hate; trusting others, he finds his trust betrayed; with vengeance in his heart he lays waste the fields which others ploughed, and wrecks the things which other hands have wrought.

**The perils of life he makes more perilous, its insecurities less secure; for war destroys the work of centuries, and cruelty bars the way to love.**

But is man made to mourn? Must always love be turned to hate? Must always crime beget still other crimes?

**"No!" say those who—failing—still aspire. "No!" who by their death men's evil deeds atone.**

Humble are our beginnings, and common to us all; one in the law we are, and one in the goal we are destined to attain.

**Man is not made to mourn; man is made to hope, to love, to inquire, to achieve.**

In common tasks are these to be established; in brotherhood life's glories must be found.

**Sweet are the ways of brotherhood, glorious the paths of  
the common life, divine the fruits of our larger loyalties.**

Wonders await thee, O Man! The universe is thine! The stars are  
symbols of thy light and truth, the sun thy emblem of sustaining  
power.

**The earth is thine, and all earth's treasures gathered at thy  
feet; thy life is thine to stifle or affirm.**

Nothing is withheld. All belongs to thee if, in togetherness thy  
work is done, in fellowship thy goals are sought.

**In wonder we behold the glories thou may'st win! In glad-  
ness we respond, for this is brotherhood; this is the eter-  
nal spirit in men's hearts; this is salvation. Here shall the  
soul find its dwelling place, humanity its peace.**

## *The Grace of Gratitude*

(The hymn is in "Common Meter." It may be sung to "St. Peter")

Thanks to the gracious human heart  
By which we live each day;  
Thanks to each one who bears a part,  
Companioning our way;

For service kind of hearth and home  
Where love enfolds us all.  
Where sorrow may for wrong atone  
And raise us when we fall;

For childhood's happiness of days,  
For strength and hope of youth,  
For aged ones whose wiser ways  
Lead us to grace and truth;

For all who toil in town or field,  
Who serve on land or sea,---  
For every blessing earth can yield.  
Our hearts will grateful be.

By J. Hutton Hynd.

## BOOKS

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### *The Birth of a World Religion*

FROM JESUS TO PAUL. By Joseph Klausner. New York: The Macmillan Company. 624 pp. \$3.00.

It is valuable for us to have an account of the beginnings of Christianity from a competent Jewish scholar. Such a study has been given us by Joseph Klausner, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in his new book, *From Jesus to Paul*. He tells us in the preface that the present volume was an inevitable sequel to his earlier splendid *Jesus of Nazareth*.

The book begins with the famous statement of Julius Wellhausen: "Jesus was not a Christian but a Jew." Klausner says that this coincides with the conclusion to which he was driven by his study of Jesus, and that the real founder of Christianity was Paul. He then addresses himself to the story of how the essential Judaism of the immediate followers of Jesus was transformed into the new religion which achieved such an amazing success.

In order to understand this story it is necessary for us to see it against the background of the Mediterranean world at the beginning of our era. The religion which Paul proclaimed met the needs of that world because he synthesized in his own person many of its diverse elements. Much of the value of Klausner's account lies in the clarity with which he makes this evident.

The first century was a time of vast ferment, political, economic, religious. There was a wide commingling of peoples; men were seized with a great restlessness because the older social forms in which they had found security had been broken up, and adequate new ones had not as yet been built in their place. The religions to which they had been accustomed had ceased to satisfy; there was much seeking for "salvation" as represented in the mystery cults. There was much moral idealism as represented in Stoicism.

Paul was a citizen of this world, its tensions and discontents; its aspirations and yearnings vibrated in his intense soul. He found an answer to his personal needs, an answer which was associated with Jesus. And because he was representative of many men in his world his answer became the medium through which their spiritual hunger was fed. Had he yielded to the demands of the little band of followers Jesus had left behind him, and conformed his teaching to what they insisted had been the message of their Master, nothing would have become of the movement beyond a sect within Judaism. Because he followed the imperative of his own nature, and spoke for the wider world of which he was a citizen. Christianity was launched on its triumphant way.



The greatest value which history has for us is to point the path of wisdom for our own day. There is a striking parallel between the conditions which obtained in the Mediterranean world of Paul's time and the conditions which exist on a planetary scale today. Again there is the same ferment resulting from the mixture of many peoples; the breakdown of old social forms and beliefs, the grouping after new food to feed the hunger of the soul, the aspirations after a more satisfying way of life. Is the time again ripe for the birth of a new religion which shall be to Christianity as Christianity was to Judaism?

The answer is "Yes!" All the elements of a world religion, universal to an extent of which Christianity is incapable, are present in the life of humanity today. The age-old idealism of the race, the surging tide of democratic aspirations, the perpetual artist in the soul of man, the new techniques which enable us to master our environment as never before, the philosophy implicit in our sciences, the great hunger of mankind for a more satisfying way of life—all of these—are elements of strength in our situation waiting only to be fused into a world faith which shall light the path of men through the age that now begins.

We can have our world religion only on condition that we emulate the daring of a Paul, refuse to be bound by the sectarian spirit that would confine our gospel within a particular tradition, synthesize within ourselves the aspirations of the larger world that is struggling to birth, and proclaim boldly the universal faith that is emerging to give that world its soul.

E. Burdette Backus.

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### *Mankind's Collective Conscience*

CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. 98 pp. \$1.25.

Jacques Maritain believes that democracy depends upon Christianity. "Government of, for and by the people" implies a certain dignity in personality, and this is precisely what Christianity invokes." "The creation of a new world," says he, "will not be the work of the war, but of the force of vision and will, and of the energies of intellectual and moral reform which will have developed in the collective conscience and in the responsible leaders." Again, "if the democracies are to win the peace after having won the war, it will be on condition that the Christian inspiration and the democratic inspiration recognize each other and become reconciled." He further asserts that "the lasting advent of the democratic state of mind and of the democratic philosophy of life requires the energies of the Gospel to penetrate secular existence."

The sermonic and hortatory overtones of the book militate against its practical use, although the writing, as literature, is well done. Our complaint would be that we are brought no nearer a solution of the problems it presumes to discuss. There is no plan of action. Far from denying a relationship between thought and deed (with Maritain's implication that Christianity is the thought and democracy the deed), we would hasten to assert the necessity of a philosophy of being. All history testifies to this, and especially in time of crisis. But these principles have been expounded time and again. We are satiated with such literature, and war and economic injustice proceed apace. The present reviewer is convinced there is no single royal road to peace. Any of a dozen plans could be made to work if we had the temerity to operate one of them. Principally, we are afraid that the "sacred cow," the profit system (we misname it "free enterprise"), would go. Finally, Christian philosophers vote in the same column as those who pay their salaries. The result is a war for natural resources by those having little, and participated in by those having much in order to protect what nature gave to all.

Only demand by the people can now save us. Leaders will arise when they know they are called. In turn we shall have a different economic and political procedure. Present leadership is bankrupt. "In all the nations today prostrate, especially in France, the leading classes have gone morally bankrupt. The failure of the world is *their* failure." So says Maritain.

We have little complaint against such teaching. Indeed, Dr. Maritain is far ahead of what we might expect of him (except that in his other writings he has shown himself to be not an orthodox Catholic). However, one may be pardoned for suspecting Catholicism in the democratic tradition. Religious totalitarianism and the democratic state are scarcely ready for holy marriage. Forgetting that, however, we still urge that like-minded people unite for action *now*, and not wait for more books to be written. Otherwise, we shall perish in the midst of plenty.

Ernest Caldecott.

## *Poetry Born of Tragedy*

BEHOLD THE JEW. By Ada Jackson. New York: The Macmillan Company. 24 pp. \$1.00.

"Pathetic Plea for the Persecuted." Such might be the title of the poems by Ada Jackson, entitled, "Behold the Jew."

Mrs. Jackson is a woman of broad sympathy, a sympathy for "all humble things," for "birds, bulls's bleeding for strutting matadors. Others slain for wantonness, for foxes and hunted deer, and all creatures man pursues . . . but, most for Jews."

Her love for all living things is not a mere sentimentality, wast-

ing itself in words, but rises from her feeling of kinship, even with inanimate nature. She feels "it should be a proud glad thing to be a Jew." "So then," she writes,

I will speak out as I have found.  
I will essay and prove the Jew  
as I weigh other nations—by  
the hearts I know, the hearts I knew.  
I will bear witness, speaking with  
a single tongue, in honesty,  
telling, in naked words, the truth  
and nothing more—God helping me.

She then goes on to recite the deeds for which we honor the Jew and the names that give luster to the race, beginning with Mendelssohn and ending with Einstein, "grown in understanding till he can look over God's shoulder," and read in his Book the how and when of time and space.

These verses not only seek to do justice to the Jew, they take high rank, as well, as poetry.

Frank S. C. Wicks.

## *History's Present Status*

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. *Edited by Joseph R. Strayer.*  
*Contributors:* Jacques Barzun, Hajo Holborn, Herbert Heaton, Dumas Malone, George La Piana. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 196 pp. \$2.50.

The titles of books are no sure guide to their contents. This one volume may be described as an effort toward the better understanding of the present status of history as a field.

The papers in this symposium are eminently sensible and interesting and they offer acquaintance with some of the major problems and adjustments among historians. Strayer points out the artistic as well as scientific aspect of the historians' work and indicates the need for balance.

Barzun applies three tests—accuracy, intellectual honesty, artistic imagination—to school textbooks, popular literature and the movies, and finds them lacking these historical virtues. Holborn offers a study of Thucydides and Ranke as originators of historical science. Heaton describes the values of impact of the economic interpretation of history as (1) a healthy antidote to romanticism, (2) a helpful emphasis on the class struggle, (3) the understanding of the economic aspects of institutions and situations. Malone writes intriguingly of biography as "personalized history" and outlines the historical requirements of biography.

By far the most interesting paper for religionists is that of La Piana. He discusses the theology of history as represented by the claims of Christianity. His analysis is brilliant and concise. He

finds four pillars which support the whole structure of theology of history. These are four great myths: (1) Divine Revelation; (2) The Golden Age and Fall of Man, His Consequent Sinful Nature; (3) The Divine Origin of Authority; (4) The Myth of the Chosen People. He traces the Christian expression of those myths in a theology of history, then describes the conflict with the myths or representations of modern times which would supersede those of Christianity. These are: (1) science and philosophy; (2) growth of knowledge and ripening of moral conscience; (3) modern democracy; (4) universal brotherhood. La Piana finds that the Christian church condemned these and for a brief period thought of Fascism and Nazism as allies to curb for them the forces of freedom and of social and economic revolutions.

"The identity of the myths which were behind the totalitarian systems with those which supplied the foundations of the Christian theology of history, was at least in part responsible for the fact that those churches failed to see that in the Fascist and Nazi savage new theology of history, there was no longer any room for moral principles or spiritual elements, and hence that churches and religions were also condemned to be destroyed by the triumph of totalitarianism. Only too late they began to realize their tragic error. But the same conservative and powerful churches have not yet realized, and perhaps it is impossible for them to realize, that their sweeping condemnation of the ideas and principles which have given rise to the new myths of freedom, of modern democracy, of progress and of radical social changes, is a no less tragic error than their initial confidence in the reactionary forces of Fascism."

A very discerning analysis is found in a statement which points out the falsity of applying the term "Philosophy of History" to what is really a theology of history. A theology of history, he believes, properly becomes apologetic.

Dale DeWitt.

## *Philosophers Are People*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL. Vol. 5. The Library of Living Philosophers. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. *Contributors:* Hans Reichenbach, Morris Weitz, Kurt Gödel, James Feibleman, G. E. Moore, Max Black, Philip P. Wiener, Albert Einstein, John Laird, Ernest Nagel, W. T. Stace, Andrew Paul Ushenko, Roderick M. Chisholm, Harold Chapman Brown, John Eloff Boodin, Justus Buchler, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Eduard C. Lindeman, V. J. McGill, Boyd H. Bode, Sidney Hook. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press. 815 pp. \$4.00.

A reviewer should perhaps apologize for assuming that there are those who do not yet really know what this Library of Living Philosophers is all about. It is the grandest thing that has yet hap-



pened to the history of modern philosophy; for Prof. Schilpp has conceived the idea—as brilliant as it is simple—that a good way to become familiar with all the ramifying problems of philosophic thought is to organize a glorified round table with some outstanding contemporary at its head. Some eighteen or twenty—in this case, twenty-one—other leading philosophers constitute the circle about him. He begins the discussion with a brief statement summarizing his intellectual development from childhood to the present moment. His colleagues then proceed, one at a time, to dissect him with critical analyses of the various aspects of his thought scheme, and with incisive questions. The discussion is brought to a close with the major philosopher's reply to his critics in which he thanks them for their "kindness," admits his errors (though not very often), and clarifies his position at many points.

The present volume is by all odds the liveliest of the series to date. This is to be expected inasmuch as Bertrand Russell is easily the most colorful and human of all the really great thinkers of our generation. And yet, merely to put it that way is to suggest at once that Russell is also the coldest and the most abstract thinker in our whole philosophical menage. No one else, not even Whitehead or Einstein, is so remotely mathematical as is Bertrand Russell, when Russell chos to be. And it is this contrast in his temperament and personality—Russell, the abstract thinker and logician on the one hand, and Russell, the warm, passionate, unconventional social rebel, politician and wit, on the other—which is the occasion for the veritable tempests which blow through the pages of this book.

Russell is attacked almost throughout the book, though most of his critics, in true academic fashion, conceal their antagonism under a veneer of polite phrases. And Russell fights back without pulling his punches. It is an intellectual—not to say, spiritual—treat for anyone who has been reading Russell's books, and who has seen his lean, ascetic looking face, see him here fire back at his critics with almost unrestrained fury. In at least one instance he does just that.

A major point of contention with Bertrand Russell's critics—especially those in the field of human relations—is that there lurks in his philosophy an irritating dualism which he makes no effort to defend or correct. Eduard C. Lindeman, under the subject, "Russell's Concise Social Philosophy," can be taken as the spokesman for these critics. "What leaves me utterly puzzled," says Lindeman, "is the attitude of a man like Russell who understands so much about the development of scientific concepts and practices and then, at the point of human applications, relegates science itself to the realm of detachment and other-worldliness." Russell, to follow Lindeman's criticism a step further, cannot even ask himself the Emersonian question, "What manner of man does science make?" for "to him science stands completely outside the realm of the personal. Science is not . . . a variety of experience comparable to

other experiences, but something which stands above and beyond. The type of society in which the scientist works and has his being must remain for him a matter of complete indifference."

Now we all know, and Mr. Lindeman knows, that Bertrand Russell is passionately interested in politics and education and every kind of social justice; but the point which Lindeman makes, and not unjustly, is that in Russell's philosophy the two are unrelated. Science remains in Russell's mind, and social passion continues to be the outpouring of his heart; and how the two shall ever meet Russell does not say. There is the possibility, of course—and it is to be hoped—that in his forthcoming book, *The History of Philosophy*, he will not leave this pressing question entirely unanswered.

One cannot say too much in praise of Paul Arthur Schilpp's great feat of philosophical engineering in bringing before the world these succeeding galaxies of outstanding philosophers, and their renewed challenge to the giants among them to organize their thinking and to make themselves understood. It shows us how human philosophers really are, and how close to everyday life the problems with which they are all concerned. With the philosophies of Benedetto Croce and Ernest Cassirer scheduled for early discussion and publication, the editor may pardon the reviewer for offering the suggestion that such distinguished religious philosophers as William E. Hocking and Edward Scribner Ames may also be included in the not distant future.

Edwin T. Buehrer.

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## *A Biologist's Larger World*

LIVING IN A REVOLUTION. By Julian Huxley. New York: Harper and Brothers. 242 pp. \$2.50.

If Margaret Fuller were to accept the universe today she would have to take as a part of it the rapidly changing social relations which can be described only as a "revolution." Julian Huxley states it this way: "Today we had better accept the revolution. Woe to those who resist it; they are at best delaying the inevitable, at worst risking more violence and bloodshed . . ."

In the first of this series of fifteen essays, and the one from which the book derives its title, Mr. Huxley drives home the point that the present World War is only a symptom of a world revolution. Only by winning the war can we still maintain a choice in the direction which the revolution will take. This is a revolution *away* from economic motivation; it is *toward* planning and control, social integration and cultural unity. It points toward a "more conscious social purpose." The alternative between which we must choose is whether the control shall be totalitarian or democratic. If the choice is to be for the democratic way it must be made now and we must

begin planning for a postwar world that will be favorable for democratic processes.

We are witnessing the end of economic man and the birth of social man. Only by the use of our scientific knowledge and conscious democratic planning can we build a stable and harmonious world peace. To Mr. Huxley the war provides us with "two jobs, not one." The first is obviously to win the war, but the second is even bigger, it is "no less than world transformation." To accomplish this will necessitate the application of the methods of science, inquiry, analysis, planning and experimentation to the whole of society. This means giving up the "myth" of sovereignty, the denial of moral and ethical responsibility on the part of the state, the "fiction" of a superior race, the individualistic concept of free enterprise as unrestricted competition and the necessity or the desirability, even, of an Absolute.

In the essay on "Philosophy in a World at War." Huxley makes the point that "to cling to certitude is to prolong an infantile reaction beyond the period when it is necessary. To become truly adult, we must learn to bear the burden of incertitude. . . . A scientifically based philosophy enables us in the first place to cease tormenting ourselves with questions that ought not to be asked because they cannot be answered—such as questions about a First Cause, or Creation, or Ultimate Reality. Secondly, it encourages us to think in terms of right direction and optimum speed in place of complete but static solutions."

Huxley not only deals in theory. He offers a definite plan for the reconstruction of Europe and he demonstrates the effectiveness of such experiments in democratic social planning as exist in the Tennessee Valley and the Columbia River Valley.

Not all of these essays deal with the revolution. There is a delightfully entertaining one on Dr. Spooner whose name has been perpetuated in the linguistic sport of "Spoonerisms." There is also a very enlightening essay on "Darwinism Today." One of the most interesting and important for those who hope for a warless world is his analysis of "War as a Biological Phenomenon."

Those who are truly interested in a democratic solution of world problems cannot afford to miss reading Julian Huxley's contribution.

Randall S. Hilton.

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## *Tradition Is Power*

HERITAGE AND DESTINY. By John A. Mackay. New York: The Macmillan Company. 109 pp. \$1.50.

He who would patronizingly accord tradition only past glory and no dynamic must reckon with the president of Princeton Theological Seminary and editor of the brilliant new quarterly, **THEOLOGY TODAY**.

"Having identified progress so exclusively with the forward look and with movement and speed, it is difficult for Americans to believe that yesterday has important lessons for today. . . . And yet the most creative and steadying word in human speech is the word 'remember.'"

Until the 19th century, deliberately chosen ideals served revolutionary purposes. Then Karl Marx discovered class-inspired ideologies. Nietzsche substituted life in all its potency for reason. And disillusionment came after the idealistic treaties of World War I. There followed a new dynamic realism. The revolutions of the past twenty-five years have been based not upon idealism, but upon an appeal to past glory: Russia, renouncing aristocratic Prussian traditions for the hammer of the workman and the sickle of the peasant; Italy, hailing the glory of Rome; Germany, resurrecting lusty pagan childhood.

Christianity provides the best alternative to the doubtful revolutions of our time which have been inspired by the realistic interest in yesterday. "God, our Contemporary, becomes known to us in the life of today as we study the record of His self-revelation in the past." The Hebrew and the Christian revelations of God speak now.

"When is man most truly man?" is the pertinent question. "When he lives his life as an integral, inseparable part of biological nature," replies the naturalistic view. "When he succeeds in satisfying his basic material wants," says the economic view (Marx). "When he is most fully rational, when he lives in accordance with reason," says the humanistic view. "When he affirms and exercises his will to power," say the superman theories (Nietzsche). The Christian view is that "man is man when he takes seriously the fact that he was made in God's image." *Person* and *love* are the key words. "When a man responds to the love of God by loving God, and in God loves his fellow men, he becomes in the fullest sense a person."

Absence of a worthy personal commitment has left its mark on our culture, too. A sense of emptiness, fear of discomfort and suffering, and fear of emotion itself, have stultified our lives. The well-spring of renewal is a reawakening of interest in spiritual, supernatural reality, and an experience of grace,—what Augustine called "the medicine of the soul working internally as drugs work externally upon the body."

Such a spiritual regeneration will have its effect upon us as a nation. A true theocracy is superior to the secular nation, which considers that public welfare demands the complete elimination of God from all official connection with its life and culture. It is superior to the demonic nation, one that has transformed itself into an ultimate, taking the place of God. Only the covenant nation, which recognizes its dependence upon God and its responsibility toward God is a sufficient alternative. "The greatest spiritual task that



confronts us consists in interpreting for our time the meaning of the motto inscribed on each copper penny, 'In God We Trust,' and in applying that interpretation to our national and international policy."

I find this incisive book a salutary antidote to the many callow utterances currently passing for "liberalism," but which are in reality only thinly disguised capitulation to secularism. Dr. Mackay's roots are deep. So should be the roots of liberals. Dr. Mackay's book is good liberal religion.

Edward W. Ohrenstein.

## *The Faith of a Philosopher*

THE RELIGION OF TOMORROW. By John Eloy Boodin. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 189 pp. \$ 2.50.

When a competent philosopher writes a competent book on religion, that is news. Such is the accomplishment of this professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles, and one of the most distinguished American exponents of Personalism. He has written a book of wide vision and profound emotion, comprehensive without suffering from abstraction, direct and persuasive to an almost homiletical degree.

In fact abstraction is exactly what Boodin inveighs against with persistent vigor. He considers that medieval Scholasticism suffered from the blight of arid intellectualism, the categories of which were bloodless, and the subtle refinements of which were incomprehensible to the average churchman. Likewise, science lacks concreteness, for science by its nature deals with classes and groups, and is concerned with individual events only insofar as they belong to a class of events. Religion's true genius is its utter concreteness, its warm, living, individual experience of the real flow of history. "In order to understand the life in religion," he says, "we must take it in concrete life situations, not as verbal abstractions. The abstractions of science and the abstractions of theology are alike deadening."

Prof. Boodin's emphases speak to the best liberal Christianity of our day. He stresses the rationality of the universe, the prevalence of creativity, the immanence of God in His creation. He describes God as limited, growing, unfolding His life in history. He lays upon us a strict admonition to re-formulate traditional Christianity into living concepts for the generation that lives, and to practice our faith with utter candor and sincerity. Underneath all his assertions concerning man and society lies a sense of profound communion with God. To say that God is love he considers to be sufficient, for love implies creation, justice, knowledge, beauty, eternal life. Love delivers to us the true insights into reality; any other view sees only

husks and shards. God, the indwelling Mind of things, is not responsible for evil in any of its manifestations, but is eternally striving to realize peace and harmony amidst the conflicting elements of creation.

Prof. Boodin's religious outlook leaves an impression of admirable balance and harmony. Wholeness is a passion with him. He maintains, in an integrated system of thought, sacraments and prophecy, theology and personal devotion, tradition and creativity, individual initiative and group action. His Christology, though somewhat ambiguous, is in the main Unitarian, affirming the unique incarnation of God "wherever there is a new birth in goodness and beauty" and rejecting the doctrine of special atonement. Since we need at all times a sense of proportion lest our religious fervor burn itself out in some bitter end of extremism, Prof. Boodin's book is a finger-post pointing to a healthy road forward.

Alexander P. Winston.

### *When Philosophers Get Together*

TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes.  
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 571 pp. \$5.00.

Mr. Runes has a grand plan for a book that will place all the philosophy of the day side by side for the purpose of achieving an all-inclusive perspective. He has gathered twenty-two essays by various philosophers on the different fields and schools. Inherent in the attempt is a difficulty that can hardly be overcome, for the purpose of each philosophy is to be all-inclusive so that placing all philosophies side by side produces a limited and eclectic view rather than an all-inclusive one. The book should be useful as a second book in philosophy for inquirers new to the field, and yet it is not an easy book to handle since many essays are partial and suggestive rather than adequately descriptive. One necessarily also asks the question whether "Twentieth Century Philosophy" is adequately covered in the selections chosen, and almost no one will fail to wonder why, at the end, is added a chapter on "Philosophies of China" as if it were an afterthought.

Some of the essays are excellent and some were obviously written without too great enthusiasm. The essays by more prominent persons, Whitehead, Russell, Santayana, Montague, Dewey, and Roscoe Pound, have appeared elsewhere and are fairly well known. Of the new essays some provide a good brief introduction to a point of view, such as those on Personalism and on Phenomenology; some are a defense against popular criticisms, such as those on Dialectical Materialism and on Metaphysics; and some are outlines of the characteristic problems in a field, such as those essays on the Philosophy of Science and on the Philosophy of History. The book



does successfully give a taste of the various modes of thought most common today.

Three of the essays bear directly upon religion. Jacques Maritain gives an expected exposition of "The Humanism of St. Thomas Aquinas." Ralph T. Flewelling traces the history of personalistic elements in occidental thought illuminatingly, and tries to show the prior claim of Personalism as a philosophy for democracy. Douglas C. Mackintosh, after tracing the rise of the enmity of "Theology and Metaphysics," explains their inter-relationship as complementary, for theology as a science with a field of data of its own provides metaphysics with one section of the findings for its final synthesis, and metaphysics thus provides a test and corroboration for the findings of theology by the resulting correlation.

I should suppose that most ministers now and then have a parishioner who knows a little philosophy and would like to know more. Such a person, if he were diligent enough, might be able to make good use of this book.

Thaddeus B. Clark.

### *Earl Browder "Accepts" Capitalism*

TEHERAN: OUR PATH IN WAR AND PEACE. By Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers. 128 pp. \$.35.

Those who are acquainted with the vitriolic language of communist literature ten or fifteen years ago will be surprised to read the considerate and conciliatory program of Earl Browder in which the underlying assumption to defeat Hitlerism is to maintain in peace as in war the collaboration achieved by the Big Three at Teheran. Says Browder:

That basic condition which has to be changed is the division of the anti-Hitler camp into two parts which do not share any common program or perspective for the world as a whole—that is, the division between the socialist and the capitalist countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Since neither side can be abolished by the other, the only way to bridge the division is for each to adapt itself to the other, to seek a program and perspective not out of their own desires and ideologies but from the possibilities of agreement between them which would preserve the most vital interests of each, and thus create the possibility to reconstruct the whole world order of nations.

This is the key to the whole book. The program now espoused by American communists is one of making the present economic order work with only such government regulation as is necessary, and with the fear of revolution sedulously removed from the capitalists' nightmares! To many this will seem a complete reversal

from those revolutionary days when the communist William Z. Foster wrote "Towards Soviet America." Apparently, there will not be any Soviet America for a long time to come. And why? Because, as Mr. Browder quite correctly states, "the American people are so ill-prepared subjectively, for any deepgoing change in the direction of socialism that post-war plans with such an aim would not unite the nation but would further divide it."

Why has it taken the communist movement so long to discover this elementary truth? Why all the attacks on moderate and Christian socialists as "labor-fakers" and "social-fascists," which, mind you, Christian socialists will never forgive and forget, precisely because they are "Christian"? It is regrettable to admit that collaboration among the progressive forces, so ardently desired by Browder, could have been obtained much sooner had American communists digested a little book by Lenin which they seldom read, "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," and had especially marked Lenin's advice to his over-enthusiastic followers:

To investigate, study, seek out, divine, grasp that which is specifically national in the concrete manner in which each country approaches the fulfilment of the single international task, the victory over opportunism and "left" doctrinairism in the working class movement.

In this sense, the new policy of excessive collaboration with the more progressive business groups is not necessarily an abandonment of Marxism, but it is excessive precisely because previous communist policy had been undialectical and un-Leninist.

There is no question among intelligent peace-lovers that World War III must be prevented by promoting such international cooperation as was ably initiated at Tehehan. The problem remaining is whether this moderation of the policies of the labor movement is to be interpreted statically, or to be changed when American progressive movements become alert to their true interests. In other words, is a "halt" necessary.

Alfred Stiernotte.



## *Introducing Our Contributors*

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HORACE S. FRIES' provocative manuscript, Humanism and Agnosticism, seemed to call for a further discussion of certain controversial aspects of the theistic problem; and since Dr. Fries considered it a good idea, CHARLES HARTSHORNE was invited to carry on. . . . This he was kind enough to do with his article, God and Man Not Rivals. These two professors are familiar to our readers, the former teaching at the University of Wisconsin, the latter at the University of Chicago. . . . WALTER JOHNSON is another University of Chicago professor. In the present article, Religion and Natural Rights in Colonial America, he rescues the great New England preacher, John Wise, from near oblivion, and restores him to his place of significance in American history. It is exciting reading, and it reminds us once again of the close relationship operating between liberal religion and government in the development of our democracy. . . . LEWIS DEXTER, formerly of Talledega College, but now of the University of Puerto Rico, contributes a sociologist's analysis of the problems created by innovators of new ideas and things. Dexter does not precisely deflate the innovator, but . . . and, "Be Not the First" is also a must article. . . . Many readers will be very much surprised to be told—as was the editor—that there is going on in Catholic South America some real, solid humanistic and naturalistic religious thinking. Enrique Molina, of Chile, is a scholar and a leader in this significant development, and JOHN H. HERSHEY, a Unitarian minister of Bridgewater, Massachusetts, introduces him in the present article, Religious Naturalism in Chile. . . . Harry Slochower, a member of the faculty of Brooklyn College, brings to our attention once again the calm and gentle spirit of the great Spinoza. Dr. Slochower, well known to Journal readers, is a frequent contributor to philosophical journals. He is putting the finishing touches to a new book dealing with the various forms of cultural alienation in our war era. . . . A new hymn, The Grace of Gratitude, published for the first time, was composed by J. HUTTON HYND, leader of the St. Louis Ethical Society. Before coming to St. Louis Dr. Hynd was associated with Stanton Coit in the development and use of modern liturgical materials in the London Society.

*Significant Books*, recently off the press, are reviewed by E. BURDETTE BACKUS of Indianapolis, ERNEST CALDECOTT of Los Angeles, THADDEUS B. CLARK, of New Orleans, RANDALL S. HILTON of Chicago, EDWARD W. OHRENSTEIN of Greenfield, Mass., FRANK S. C. WICKS of Indianapolis, DALE DE WITT, of New York City, ALEXANDER P. WINSTON of Jamaica Plain, Mass. and ALFRED STIERNOTTE of Vancouver, B. C.